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during the course of the project. 
Following completion of the project, Plaintiff submitted 
several claims for compensation for the additional work and demand-
ed arbitration of those claims pursuant to the arbitration agree-
ment contained in the subcontracts. Defendant denied payment of 
Plaintiff's claims and refused to submit the claims to arbitration. 
As a result of Defendant's refusal to arbitrate, Plaintiff brought 
suit in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County for breach of contract and to compel arbitration of 
Plaintiff's claims. 
During the course of the litigation, Defendant raised counter-
claims, primarily as offsets to Plaintiff's claims, alleging 
liability for failure of performance against Plaintiff. Plaintiff 
brought a Motion for Summary Judgment to dismiss Defendantfs 
counterclaims and to compel arbitration. Defendant responded by 
bringing a cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking 
dismissal of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to the Utah contractor 
licensing law, alleging inter alia that Plaintiff did not hold a 
proper contractor's license and, therefore, Defendant alleged that 
Plaintiff was barred from bringing an action to recover compensa-
tion earned for work performed as a contractor, including an action 
for specific performance of the arbitration provision of the 
subcontract agreements. 
The trial court, following unreported oral arguments on the 
issues of both the contractor licensing issue and the arbitration 
issue, issued an Order in favor of Defendant which summarily denied 
3 
Plaintiff's Motion and dismissed Plaintiff's action, including the 
cause of action to compel arbitration, for failure to obtain a 
valid contractor's license. 
Plaintiff contends in this appeal that it was error for the 
trial court to issue such an Order since the contractors license 
is not required to maintain an action to compel arbitration. In 
the alternative, if a contractors license is required to maintain 
such an action, sufficient evidence was presented to the trial 
court to establish that Plaintiff had substantially complied with 
the Utah contractor licensing laws and, additionally, to establish 
the requisite factual setting wherein the common-law exceptions to 
the general statutory bar to recovery by an unlicensed contractor 
would apply. Plaintiff now requests that this Court reverse the 
judgment ordering dismissal of Plaintiff's action, and remand the 
case to the trial court for resolution on the merits of the 
underlying claim for specific performance of the arbitration 
agreements and/or for breach of contract. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. A.J. Mackay & Sons was a partnership prior to being 
incorporated in 1979. At the time the business was incorporated 
in 1979, the name was changed to A.J. Mackay Company. Record at 
50, 97 and 111. 
2. Plaintiff lawfully incorporated and changed its name to 
A.J. Mackay Company while continuing to operate with the same 
personnel and management, and under the same contractor's license. 
Record at 50 and 111. 
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3. The partnership had been properly licensed prior to 
incorporation and the corporation maintained the same contractors 
license since that time. All financial responsibility and 
technical qualifications were met on each occasion the contractors 
license was routinely renewed. Record at 111 and 112. 
4. No other entity exists which claims the right to use or 
uses the contractors license and Plaintiff has continuously worked 
under the contractors license since its incorporation in 1979. 
Record at 50 and 111. 
5. Plaintiff inadvertently failed to change the name on its 
contractor's license until the routine renewal of the contractors 
license in 1985. Record at 111 and 112. 
6. There has only been one business entity and one contrac-
tors license for Plaintiff company since 1979. Record at 50, 111 
and 112. 
7. At the time the name was changed on the contractors 
license in 1985, no special qualifications were required. The same 
license bearing the same license number was renewed. The only 
difference was the new name appeared on the license. Thus, the 
change in 1985 was merely a change in name on the same license, and 
not the issuance of new license. Record at 112. 
8. During the time the Plaintiff maintained the contractors 
license under the previous name, Plaintiff and Defendant had 
numerous dealings in the normal course of business wherein 
Plaintiff and Defendant contracted for Plaintiff to perform work 
on various projects. Record at 49 and 112. 
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9. On or about February 1, 1984, Plaintiff, as a subcon-
tractor, entered into several subcontract agreements with Defendant 
under which Plaintiff was to perform services and to provide 
equipment pursuant to the construction of Utah Department of 
Transportation project number 1-215-9(72)10, located West of Little 
Cottonwood Creek to West of 1300 East in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Record at 36 and 49. 
10. At the time the subcontracts were entered into, Plaintiff 
was duly licensed under the laws of the State of Utah to perform 
services required under the subcontract agreements under the name 
of "A.J. Mackay & Sons." Record at 50, 61, 111 and 112. 
11. The subcontract agreements entered into by and between 
Plaintiff and Defendant contain provisions which require the 
arbitration of disputes between Plaintiff and Defendant, including 
disputes as to the existence of and compensation for extra work. 
Record at 28 and 62. 
12. Plaintiff has made demand on Defendant to arbitrate the 
disputes and the damages resulting therefrom, which demand has been 
denied by Defendant in breach of the subcontract agreements. 
Record at 2. 
13. Because Defendant has refused to honor its subcontracts 
and arbitrate Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff commenced this action 
on or about December 23, 1988 seeking arbitration of its claims 
and for payment for certain work performed by Plaintiff which was 
above and beyond the original scope of the subcontracts which are 
the subject of this action. Record at 2. 
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14. At all times during the course of construction, 
Plaintiff's work under the subcontracts and otherwise was subject 
to the inspection and approval of both Defendant, a licenced 
contractor and UDOT, neither of which are members of the general 
public, and both of which are sophisticated, construction 
contracting entities. Record at 49 and 112. 
15. Plaintiff is a solvent and financially responsible 
construction company and was solvent and financially responsible 
at all times material to the performance of the subcontracts in 
question. There was at no time during the course of the subject 
contracts a risk that Plaintiff, in any way, posed any type of 
danger to the general public or to the Defendant or to UDOT. 
Record at 49, 50, 111 and 112. 
16. A.J. Mackay & Sons and its successor A.J. Mackay Company 
have had a long history of working for Defendant Okland Construc-
tion Company. Record at 112. 
17. Defendant was required by the terms of its contract with 
UDOT to not subcontract more than 50% of the project work. Okland 
thereafter requested that A.J. Mackay Company cooperate in giving 
the appearance to UDOT that A.J. Mackay was not a subcontractor but 
rather Okland was leasing equipment from A.J. Mackay Company. In 
addition, A.J. Mackay Company's project superintendent was placed 
on Defendant's payroll. However, all payments to the project 
superintendent were deducted from the progress payments due A.J. 
Mackay Company. Record at 49, 50 and 112. 
18. Between Plaintiff and Defendant there was never any 
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question that the subcontracts controlled the relationship between 
1 1 le Pi ain tiff and Defendant Record at 112. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
As a matter of law, where the parties to a contract provide 
a remedy other thai seeking redress in the courts, Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 58-50-11 does not apply since that section only 
bars the commencement or maintenance of an action for compensation. 
Thus, where the parties to the contract have agreed to arbitrate 
the disputes between them, nothing should prevent the commenceme:^. 
or maintenance of an action to enforce arbitration of the disputes 
since such an action is one for compensation. 
Further, even if Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 were to 
apply to an action to compel arbitration, under the facts presented 
to the trial court on the motions for summary judgment, it is clear 
that Plaintiff substantially complied with the Utah contractor 
licensing laws in that it maintained a valid contractor's license 
at all times material and relevant to this action. While it is 
acknowledged that at the time the subcontracts were made, the name 
on the license was thai of the Plaintiff's predecessor partnership, 
under the facts of this case the Plaintiff was qualified for and 
maintained a valid contractor's license for the work it now seeks 
compensa~ ne business entity was changed from the 
predecessor partnership to the current corpoii ate entity; the name 
change at the time of incorporation was minor and kept the 
substance a! Ihr name appearing on the contractor's license; the 
corporate entity maintained the contractors license in good 
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standing at all times and fully met all of the financial 
responsibility and technical qualifications required for license 
renewal; at the time the name on the contractors license was 
changed on the license, no new license was issued but rather the 
name was merely changed; no disciplinary action was ever taken by 
the former Division of Contractors for the inadvertent failure to 
change the name on the license; etc.). 
Thus, since Plaintiff was properly licensed, Defendant's 
assertion that Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 bars recovery 
by an unlicensed or improperly licensed contractor does not apply 
to Plaintiff. 
Alternatively, even if the Court were to determine that 
Plaintiff has not substantially complied with the Utah contractors 
licensing laws and is improperly licensed, the operation of Utah 
Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 does not bar recovery by Plaintiff 
of the amounts it claims against Defendant herein. 
The bar against recovery of compensation by unlicensed or 
improperly licensed contractors was originally created by the Utah 
Supreme Court. The creation of the common-law rule against 
recovery was to assist in the purpose of the contractor licensing 
laws, i.e., to protect members of the general public against 
unqualified and financially irresponsible contractors. However, 
in order to avoid the harshness of the rule against recovery, to 
avoid inequitable forfeitures, and to prevent parties from unjustly 
avoiding their legitimate contract obligations, the Utah Supreme 
Court, through many decisions, also created many equitable excep-
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tions to the rule against recovery. 
The common-law ni 1o against recovery was codified by the Utah 
legislature in 1981. However, the common-I aw equitable exceptions 
to the application of the rule against recovery remained intact. 
Thus, Plainttft asserts that even if its contractor's license 
was technically deficient under the terms
 s. - rotated 
Section 58-50-11, the equitable exceptions tc the statutory bar 
created by tl li s coi ir t app] } ? \ inder the circumstances of this case. 
The facts which give rise to the application of tlle equitable 
exceptions to the rule against recovery are: (1) Plaintiff worked 
under the direct supei vision ni ,i lin-:. 1 contractor (i.e, the 
Defendant); (2) neither the Utah Department oi Transportation, the 
z the roject, nor the Defendant general contractor are 
members of the ciass of persons \ vhioh I ho co n t r a c t o r licensing law 
is designed to protect; (3) Defendant relied oiI its past dealings 
with 1*."* rather than on the contractor licensing statute to 
ensure that Plaintiff was a responsible cont-ractor; (4) Plaintiff 
has all times complied with the financial and technical 
responsibj J H";i|l requirements of the Utah contractor 1 icensing law; 
(5) Plaintiff has not acted in a willful, fraudulei it on deceitful 
manner and has not flagrantly disregarded the contractor licensing 
law; (6) Plai n ti ff has corrected and all possible technical 
deficiencies in its contractors license; (7) it would an 
unnecessary and undue forfeiture in this case to bar Plaintifffs 
action to ipeover on its .subcontracts; and (8) the benefit "of such 
forfeiture would benefit not the State but only the Defendai it who 
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has wrongfully repudiated its contractual obligations. 
Defendant in the present action should not be allowed to use 
the statutory bar to avoid the just resolution of Plaintiff's 
claims based on a disputed technical deficiency in its compliance 
with the contractors licensing law which has not been proved at 
trial. This is especially true where there are judicially created 
equitable exceptions to the rule against recovery which strongly 
militate against such a result under the circumstances of the 
present case. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant, in a blatant effort to avoid honoring its contract 
obligations, has raised the argument that Plaintiff was not duly 
licensed to provide construction services on the subject project 
so that its claims to enforce the subcontract provisions are barred 
by Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 (1953 as re-enacted in 
1985). This section states: 
No contractor may act as agent or commence or 
maintain any action in any court of the state 
for collection of compensation for the per-
formance of any act for which a license is 
required by this chapter without alleging and 
proving that he was a properly licensed 
contractor when the contract sued upon was 
entered into and when the alleged cause of 
action arose. 
This statutory provision has had a long and varied history as 
discussed above. However, there has only been one case which has 
been decided under the rule against recovery since it was codified 
by the Utah legislature in 1981. That case is Wilderness Building 
Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), and is 
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discussed in detail in Section XV. below. Although the Wilderness 
Court u J Lliiiati- l.y ruled against the claimant, it applied the equit-
able exceptions to the rule against recover y to tl le facts of that 
case. 
I. STANDARD I CASES DECIDED ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
i ;: " l-e Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
summary judgment should be granted only if there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment 
as a matter ui \.tw i, See Bowen v. Riverton city, 656 P. 2d 434 (Utah 
1982). 
Initially * MI - must decide if the Defendant was 
entit «- , . i law. This Court must decide 
whether as a matter of law a person must comply wit 
contractors licensing statute t > enforce arbitration provisions 
agreed upon *. r\* • act. inxs Court must also 
decide as a matter of law whether the equitable exceptions to the 
rule against recovery as stated in Utah Code Annotated Section 58-
50-11 are applicable. Pho stdudard ii ie* M1^ which this Court 
applies in reviewing the trial court's decisions regarding issues 
of 1 iw i one of correctness. No deference is given to the trial 
courtf s determination. 
Since the Wilderness Building Systems v. Chapman, 699 P.zld 766 
(Utali 1985), Court has already made the determination that the 
equitable exceptions do apply, the question becomes one of viewing 
the facts presented to the trial court in the light most favorable 
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to the Plaintiff. 
After resolving these legal issues in favor of the Plaintiff, 
this Court must examine there facts in the light most favorable to 
the Plaintiff. Ld. Since there are disputed issues of material 
fact regarding the elements of the equitable exceptions to the rule 
against recovery, the trial court's decision must be reversed and 
the case remanded. Further, there are uncontroverted facts put 
forth by the Plaintiff which clearly fall within the equitable 
exceptions to the rule against recovery. 
The trial court's decision was based solely upon its view that 
the Plaintiff was not properly licensed. There was no discussion 
of the equitable exceptions nor were there any findings which would 
indicate the lower court's reasoning. 
II. LICENSURE UNDER THE CONTRACTOR LICENSING STATUTE IS NOT A 
PREREQUISITE TO COMMENCING AND MAINTAINING AN ACTION TO 
ENFORCE ARBITRATION PROVISIONS OF A WRITTEN CONTRACT ENTERED 
INTO BY THE PARTIES TO THE ACTION. 
By its own terms, Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 
purports to bar only the commencement or maintenance of actions in 
the courts of this state for "collection of compensation". 
However, Plaintiff's action herein was not an action for collection 
of compensation. Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 should be 
applied strictly according to its terms since it seeks to abrogate 
a fundamental right of having one's disputes resolved through the 
courts. 
Plaintiff is merely seeking to enforce an alternative dispute 
resolution procedure outlined in the contract between Plaintiff and 
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Defendant. Where the parties to a contract have agreed upon a 
method of dispute resolution other than a collection action in the 
"courts of the state", Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 should 
not bar an action to enforce the alternative method of dispute 
resolution. There is no basis in law or in fact to prevent the 
Plaintiff from enforcing the arbitration provisions of the 
subcontracts. See generally, Memoranda of Plaintiff beginning 
Record at 49 and 114. 
III. APPELLANT IS, AND AT ALL TIMES MATERIAL TO THE SUBJECT 
CONTRACTS, WAS A DULY LICENSED CONTRACTOR UNDER THE LAWS OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH SO THAT ITS CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BY THE 
PROVISIONS OF THE UTAH CONTRACTOR LICENSING STATUTE. 
Defendant has argued that Plaintiff is barred from maintaining 
the present action by asserting that the Plaintiff was not properly 
licensed under the Utah contractor licensing statute. This 
argument is without merit since the Plaintiff has at all times 
relevant to the subcontracts in question held a valid contractor's 
license and has every remedy at law or in equity available to it 
to enforce its contractual and other legal rights. 
The fact that Plaintiff incorporated its construction company 
and changed its name from "A.J. Mackay & Sons" to "A.J. Mackay 
Company" does not invalidate its contractor's license. Nor does 
the fact of the reorganization defeat or frustrate the purposes for 
which the licensing statute was enacted. 
Plaintiff has at all times complied with the financial and 
technical responsibility requirements of the Utah contractor 
licensing law. It was the Plaintiff whose financial responsibility 
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and technical competence qualified for the contractors license 
between 1979 (the date of incorporation) and 1985 (the date the 
corporate name was substituted on the license). At the time of the 
name substitution in 1985, Plaintiff was not required to re-qualify 
with regard to either financial responsibility or technical 
competence. Plaintiff has not acted in a willful, fraudulent or 
deceitful manner and has not flagrantly disregarded the contractor 
licensing law. 
Utah has long followed the general common-law rule of 
requiring compliance with the licensing statutes as a prerequisite 
to recovery for services requiring a license. See Olsen v. Reese, 
114 Utah 411, 200 P. 2d 733 (1948) and Mosley v. Johnson. 22 Utah 
2d 348, 453 P. 2d 149 (1969). However, several exceptions to the 
general rule were created by the Utah Supreme Court which allowed 
a person who was not licensed as required by statute to prevail in 
a suit to collect monies due. The Utah Supreme Court referring to 
the general rule has stated, "Our common law rule [is] not 
mechanically applied. Rather this Court under the old [licensing] 
statute considered the merits of each particular case so as to 
avoid unreasonable penalties and forfeitures." Loader v. Scott 
Construction Corporation., 681 P. 2d 1227, 1229 (Utah 1984). In 
the case of Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving, 
561 P. 2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977), quoting Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 
6A, Sec. 1512, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Although many courts yearn for a mechanically 
applicable rule, they have not made one in the 
present instance. Justice requires that the 
penalty should fit the crime; and justice and 
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sound policy do not always require the 
enforcement of the licensing statutes by large 
forfeitures going not to the state but 
repudiating defendants• 
The Court also stated that "This court has not applied the 
general rule of denying relief to unlicensed persons mentioned 
above inflexibly or too broadly." Fillmore at 689. See also 
Lignell v. Berg. 593 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1979). Further, the Court 
in Fillmore said: 
The parties should be able to present their 
positions to the court because under the facts 
of this case—which are undisputed concerning 
whether the general rule supra ought to be 
applied—the law intended for protecting the 
public might become "an unwarranted shield for 
the avoidance of a just obligation." 
Fillmore at 690 (quoting in part Matchett v. Gould. 131 Cal. App. 
2d 821, 281 P. 2d 524 (1955)). 
It is due to the harshness of the general rule and the penalty 
or forfeiture which the strict application of the general rule can 
produce that the Utah Supreme Court has carved out several 
exceptions to the general rule. The fundamental principles upon 
which the Court has relied in creating the exceptions are that: 
(1) The licensing statutes are in place to 
protect the general public against technically 
incompetent and financially irresponsible 
contractors and, therefore, a person not 
within the protected class under the statute 
will not be allowed to assert the defense; and 
(2) Even if the person claiming the defense is 
within the protected class under the statute, 
if adequate protection of the person in the 
protected class is provided by some way other 
than the licensing statutes, the general rule 
will not be applied. 
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In 1981, the Utah legislature codified the common-law general 
rule at Utah Code Annotated Section 58A-1-26 and that Section was 
re-enacted in 1985 as Section 58-50-11. That section stated: 
No contractor may act as agent or commence or 
maintain any action in any court of the state 
for collection of compensation for the 
performance of any act for which a license is 
required by this chapter without alleging and 
proving that he was a properly licensed 
contractor when the contract sued upon was 
entered into and when the alleged cause of 
action arose. 
While the common-law rule was the subject of substantial 
litigation and court decision, both before and after codification, 
the Utah Supreme Court, has had only one occasion to apply the 
codified general rule. See Wilderness Building Systems. Inc. v. 
Chapman, 699 P. 2d 766 (Utah 1985). Although the Court in the 
Wilderness Building Systems case ultimately held that the claimant 
was barred from recovery, it analyzed Section 58A-1-26 within the 
framework of several of the exceptions to the common-law rule which 
had been plead by the unlicensed contractor. Thus, in light of 
Wilderness Building Systems, it is obvious that the common-law 
exceptions still apply to the rule that an unlicensed or improperly 
licensed contractor is barred from recovery as stated in Utah Code 
Annotated Section 58-50-11. 
There are at least two exceptions to the general rule which 
are applicable to this case and which compel reversal of the lower 
court's Order of summary judgment. Further, there were many facts 
which were before the lower court which should have prevented it 
from ruling that the Plaintiff's action was barred. 
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First, an unlicensed contractor may recover for work performed 
if it was under the control and inspection of a licensed 
contractor. See Fillmore Products. Inc. v. Western States 
Paving, 561 P.2d 687 (Utah 1977); Motivated Management 
International v. Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979); Kinkella v. 
Baugh, 660 P. 2d 233 (Utah 1983); George v. Oren Limited & 
Associates, 672 P.2d 732 (Utah 1983); and Wilderness Building 
Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985). 
Plaintiff worked under the direct supervision and inspection 
of Defendant, a properly licensed contractor. This is especially 
true since the Defendant was attempting to give the appearance to 
UDOT that Plaintiff's personnel were working directly for Defendant 
rather than a subcontractor/general contractor relationship as was 
the true nature of the relationship. 
The second exception to the rule against recovery which is 
applicable here is where the contractor has been previously 
licensed and the license has lapsed through inadvertence and not 
for cause or through deliberate rebellion to the licensing 
statutes, recovery by an unlicensed contractor is permitted. See 
Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah 1979); and Loader v. Scott 
Construction Corporation, 681 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1984). 
The Utah Supreme Court has been loath to deny recovery to a 
claimant except in circumstances where that claimant has willfully 
sought to circumvent the contractor licensing laws. That is simply 
not the situation in the case at bar. Plaintiff maintained a 
contractors license and believes that it was properly licensed. 
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At the time the possible deficiency was discovered in 1985, the 
name on the license was changed. It is helpful to note that the 
Division of Contractors did not require re-qualification when the 
name was changed. Additionally, the license number remained the 
same. The only thing that changed with regard to the license was 
the name. Even then, the name was substantially the same as the 
name shown previously on the license. 
The most that can be said with regard to the alleged problems 
with Plaintiff's license is that the problems were inadvertent. 
Plaintiff has at all times complied with the financial and 
technical responsibility requirements of the Utah contractor 
licensing law. Plaintiff has not acted in a willful, fraudulent 
or deceitful manner and has not flagrantly disregarded the 
contractor licensing law. Furthermore, Plaintiff has corrected any 
and all possible technical deficiencies in its contractors license. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also looked to additional factors 
which are relevant here. First, the licensing laws are intended 
to protect the general public from financially irresponsible and 
technically incompetent contractors. Where the person asserting 
that the claimant's recovery is barred by the application of the 
rule against recovery is not a member of the protected class, the 
Utah Supreme Court has refused to apply the rule. Thus, a general 
contractor has not been allowed to raise the rule against recovery 
in an action by a subcontractor. 
In the present case, neither the Utah Department of 
Transportation, the owner of the project, nor the Defendant general 
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contractor are members of the class of persons which the contractor 
licensing law is designed to protect. Therefore, Plaintiff's 
claims should not be barred. 
Another example where the Utah Supreme Court has been hesitant 
to apply the rule against recovery is where the person raising the 
defense has repudiated his contractual obligations and where 
application of the rule would cause unnecessary and undue forfeit-
ures. In the present case, it would work an unnecessary and undue 
forfeiture in this case to bar Plaintiff's action to recover on its 
subcontracts. Further, the benefit of such a forfeiture would 
benefit not the State but only the Defendant who has wrongfully 
repudiated its contractual obligations. 
The Utah Supreme Court has also held that where the protection 
afforded by the licensing statute was provided by some other means, 
the rule against recovery did not apply. Thus, the Court has held 
that where there were payment and performance bonds, the protection 
is provided by a means other than the licensing statute. Further-
more, the Court has held that where a person relied upon his past 
dealings with the claimant rather than relying on the licensing 
status of the claimant, the rule against recovery did not apply. 
In the present case, there is ample evidence that Defendant 
did not rely upon the licensing status of the Plaintiff in 
contracting on the subject project. 
The strict application of the rule against recovery would not 
be appropriate in this case for an additional reason. The Utah 
State Division of Contractors and its successor the Utah State 
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Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing has had a 
policy allowing contractors whose licenses have lapsed or whose 
business organization has changed to renew their licenses without 
any additional requirements. It is as though the renewal were made 
in the normal course. The facts of this case are that Plaintiff's 
contractor's license inadvertently lapsed, if at all, and the 
Plaintiff was allowed to renew its license with the name change 
without any financial or technical re-qualification. Therefore, 
Plaintiff should be allowed to maintain its action and should be 
granted summary judgment to compel arbitration and/or recover for 
the additional work performed. 
IV. JUDICIALLY CREATED EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTE BARRING 
COLLECTION ACTIONS BY NON-LICENSED OR IMPROPERLY LICENSED 
CONTRACTORS ARE STILL VALID WHERE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN REPEALED 
BY LEGISLATIVE ACTION OR REJECTED BY EXPRESS COURT RULING, AND 
ARE APPLICABLE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE. 
APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTORY BAR OF 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 58-50-11 DOES NOT FRUSTRATE THE 
PURPOSE OR THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE UTAH CONTRACTOR 
LICENSING STATUTE. 
Defendant's contention that this action by Plaintiff to 
enforce the arbitration provisions of the subject subcontracts is 
barred by Plaintiff's failure to be properly licensed as provided 
by the Utah Contractor Licensing statute, Utah Code Annotated 
Section 58-50-11, is without merit. The Utah Supreme Court has 
clearly stated the policy to be followed in this State regarding 
the licensing of contractors and has applied the equitable 
exceptions to the codified rule against recovery. 
The case of Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699 
P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), is the only statement to date by the Utah 
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Supreme Court regarding the right of an improperly licensed 
contractor to bring an action for compensation in the courts under 
the present Utah licensing statute. The opinion in Wilderness 
clearly confirms that equitable exceptions to the statutory rule 
are still applicable. The Defendant and the trial court have 
ignored this fact. Had the trial court not ignored the Wilderness 
case, it should have reviewed the equitable exceptions and 
concluded that there were sufficient factual issues to prevent the 
granting of summary judgment against the Plaintiff. 
In Wilderness Building Systems the Supreme Court held that, 
under the specific facts of that case, the equitable or "common-
law" exceptions traditionally afforded an improperly licenced 
contractor seeking compensation, did not apply to that particular 
fact situation. However, nowhere in the opinion does the Court 
state that those exceptions will not apply under any circumstances, 
or regardless of the inequity done to the Plaintiff. 
In Wilderness, plaintiffs appealed from an adverse judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict which was entered on the grounds that 
neither plaintiff was a licensed contractor, so that their claims 
were barred by operation of the Utah contractor licensing statute. 
The plaintiffs in Wilderness argued that three exceptions to the 
statutory bar to recovery were applicable to the facts in that 
case. First, that an unlicensed contractor may recover from one 
who is otherwise protected from the harm the licensing requirements 
were designed to prevent. The Court found that under the facts of 
the case, there was insufficient evidence to support the contention 
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that the defendants were protected by their own knowledge and 
expertise. Thus the court, after considering the application of 
that exception to the statutory rule, held in favor of defendants. 
Second, the plaintiffs in Wilderness argued that an unlicensed 
contractor may recover on a theory of unjust enrichment from one 
who knew or should have known at the time of contracting that the 
contractor was unlicensed, an argument which also failed under the 
particular facts of the Wilderness case. 
Finally, the plaintiffs urged that an unlicensed contractor 
may recover for work performed under the supervision of a licensed 
contractor. The Supreme Court rejected this argument in the 
Wilderness case because there was no evidence in the trial record 
to support the claim that plaintiff was supervised by a licenced 
contractor. 3x1. at 769. 
Thus, under the particular facts of Wilderness, the plaintiffs 
were not allowed to maintain their action for compensation. 
However, the particular facts of the case at bar indicate that the 
Plaintiff falls within several of the equitable exceptions to the 
rule against recovery. 
Contrary to Defendant's assertion in the case at bar, 
Wilderness indicates that the equitable exceptions to the statutory 
bar are still in effect. But unlike the facts in Wilderness, the 
case at bar is a proper factual case to enforce those exceptions. 
In Wilderness, plaintiffs cited many of the same cases on which 
Plaintiff now relies in support of its position. Nowhere in the 
Wilderness opinion does the court specifically overrule any of 
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those cases, nor does it state that the principles of those cases 
are no longer enforceable under the codified common-law rule. The 
fact that the Utah Supreme Court reviewed the exceptions and their 
applicability to the facts of the case is strong evidence that the 
exceptions still exist and are applicable in a case such as the one 
at bar. 
In Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving, Inc., 
561 P. 2d 687 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court, quoting Corbin 
on Contracts, stated that: 
Where it is clear that the statute requires 
the license . . . the courts usually . . . 
hold that bargains made in breach of the law 
are not enforceable by the wrongdoer. This 
accords with sound policy except when it 
operates with disproportionate severity. . . 
. In general, the nonenforceability of (such) 
bargains will have a salutary effect in 
causing obedience to the licensing statute. 
Therefore, the general rule will no doubt 
continue to be maintained as the "general" 
rule, while still permitting the court to 
consider the merits of the particular case and 
to avoid unreasonable penalties and 
forfeitures. 
Although many courts yearn for a 
mechanically applicable rule, they have not 
made one in the present instance. Justice 
requires that the penalty should fit the 
crime; and justice and sound policy do not 
always require the enforcement of licensing 
statutes by large forfeitures going not to the 
state but repudiating defendants. 
Id. at 689 (emphasis added). 
To bar Plaintiff's claim under the facts of the present case 
would be to work both an unreasonable penalty and a forfeiture, 
and would fly in the face of justice. This is especially true 
where Plaintiff primarily seeks not to recover money due under the 
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contract, but merely the benefit of its bargain to resolve disputes 
in an alternate forum which is more advantageous and less expensive 
for both parties. In the present case, Plaintiff should be allowed 
to enforce the arbitration agreement notwithstanding the purported 
irregularities in its contractor's license where: 
(1) at all material times Plaintiff had been renewing a 
contractor's license but through inadvertence merely 
failed to change the name on the license from A. J. 
Mackay & Sons to A. J. Mackay Company for a period of 
time; 
(2) the Defendant is not among the class whom the statute was 
intended to protect, an exception provided under the rule 
of Lignell v. Berg, 593 P.2d 800 (Utah); 
(3) the owner of the project was UDOT, another sophisticated 
contracting entity, is also not among the class intended 
to be protected; 
(4) Plaintiff acted as a subcontractor under the direct 
supervision of a licensed contractor with whom it has a 
well established history of contracting, and for whom 
Plaintiff's supervisor, at certain times worked on 
Defendant's payroll, as discussed in Motivated 
Management v. Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979), and 
Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233 (Utah 1983); and 
(5) the equitable exceptions to the statutory rule, created 
by the cases previously cited by Plaintiff, including 
Loader v. Scott Construction Corp., 681 P.2d 1227 (Utah 
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1984) and Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States 
Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687 (Utah 1977) are still 
controlling. Until the Supreme Court reverses its 
decision in these cases, the equitable exceptions to the 
statutory bar here in question still apply under the 
proper circumstances, such as the present case. 
Even though the Defendant was aware of this Court's ruling in 
the Wilderness case, in the court below the Defendant argued in its 
memoranda in support of its motion for summary judgment below, that 
the Utah statute should be strictly enforced based on California 
policy considerations and a holding by the California Court of 
Appeals in the case of General Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of 
San Bernadino Co., 102 Cal. Rptr. 541 (Cal. App. 1972). While that 
case is, as Defendant suggests, an interesting comparison to the 
present case, it is without persuasive or precedential value where 
the Utah Supreme Court has already decided both the Utah law and 
Utah public policy issues relevant to the application of the 
equitable exceptions to the codified common-law rule. 
The Utah cases on which Plaintiff relies are replete with 
explanations of the legislative intent and purpose of the Utah 
legislature when it codified the common-law rule into the present 
licensing statute. Regardless of what the California policy is, 
the policy in Utah is that although the statute acts as a general 
bar to recovery, it will not be enforced mechanically or strictly 
where the dangers against which the legislature sought to protect 
do not arise, and where strict enforcement of the statute would 
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cause unnecessary and unreasonable forfeitures and would not be in 
the best interest of justice. 
Defendant argues, based on General Ins., Id., that "If the 
legislature intended to create any exceptions, it could have easily 
added them to the statute. Such exceptions to the statute are 
matters for the legislature to determine and not for the courts." 
However, the Utah Supreme Court, in an effort to avoid unreasonable 
penalties and forfeitures not intended by the legislature, has 
carved out the exceptions pursuant to their equitable powers and 
in furtherance of the legislative purpose of protecting the general 
public from financially irresponsible and technically incompetent 
contractors. These exceptions have survived for more than ten 
years during which time the legislature has had more than one 
opportunity to either narrow their application or remove them 
altogether. It is more easily inferred from the legislative 
history on this issue, that the legislature supports application 
of the exceptions where the purpose of the statute is essentially 
met as it is in the present case. 
V. STRICT APPLICATION OF UTAH CODE ANNOTATED Section 58-50-11 IN 
THE PRESENT CASE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION OF THE EQUITABLE 
EXCEPTIONS WOULD BE A VIOLATION OF PLAINTIFF'S DUE PROCESS 
RIGHTS UNDER BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND UTAH CONSTITUTIONS AND 
WOULD BE INVALID UNDER OPEN COURTS PROVISION OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION. 
At the very least, application of Utah Code Annotated Section 
58-50-11 without consideration of the equitable exceptions would 
be a violation of Plaintiff's due process rights under both the 
United States and Utah Constitutions and would be invalid under 
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open courts provision of the Utah Constitution. 
A fundamental principle underlying the United States and the 
Utah Constitutions is that of due process of law. In the case at 
bar, if the Court were to apply Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-
11, Plaintiff's due process rights would be violated. See XIV 
Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
7 of the Utah Constitution. The statute and the rule against 
recovery are proper only because of the application of the 
equitable exceptions. This is true since in order to pass due 
process scrutiny, the statute must be tailored to accomplish a 
valid state interest. However, where a statute bears no reasonable 
relationship to any legitimate state interest, the statute must be 
ruled invalid. The only legitimate state interest which could be 
supported by Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 is to protect the 
general public from financially irresponsible and technically 
incompetent contractors. In fact, that is the long-stated purpose 
of both the common-law and codified rule against recovery by an 
unlicensed or improperly licensed contractor. A blind, mechanical, 
application of Section 58-50-11 cannot be said to accomplish a 
legitimate state interest. Indeed, there would be no protections 
at all to ensure that the statute did in fact accomplish the stated 
purpose. 
The threshold question for any due process inquiry is that 
there must be some state action which interferes with a protected 
right. Clearly the threshold requirement for state action has been 
met in this case. First, the state legislature has enacted 
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legislation which regulates Plaintiff's chosen profession and 
significantly impacts Plaintiff's right to contract. Second, the 
lower court has applied Section 58-50-11 blindly to the detriment 
of the Plaintiff. Thus, state action is clearly present in this 
case. 
The threshold requirement that the state action affect a 
protected right is also clearly met in the present case. It has 
been said that the right to contract is both a liberty and a 
property right and is within the protection of guarantee against 
the taking of liberty or property without due process of law. See 
Application of Forde L. Johnson Oil Co., 84 Idaho 288, 372 P.2d 135 
(1962). 
Further, the Utah Supreme Court has stated ". . . inasmuch as 
the licensing of [a] business does represent a substantial property 
interest . . ., which also has its effect upon the public welfare, 
it should not be destroyed or disrupted arbitrarily, nor without 
following fundamental standards of due process of law . . . ." 
Anderson v. Utah County Board of Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214, 1216 
(Utah 1979). Thus a protected right of the Plaintiff has been 
affected by the state action. 
Once the threshold test has been satisfied, as in the present 
case, in order for a statute to pass due process muster, the 
inquiry becomes whether the state action bears a reasonable 
relationship to some legitimate state interest. While states have 
fairly broad powers to regulate individuals and businesses under 
the guise of protecting the "public health safety and welfare," the 
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power to regulate is not without limits. In order for a statute 
bo be upheld, it must be based upon a legitimate state interest and 
Lt must bear some reasonable relationship to that interest. In 
ether words, the statute must accomplish a legitimate state 
Interest without overreaching. 
While the contractors licensing statute and specifically Utah 
Zlode Annotated Section 58-50-11 when coupled with the equitable 
exceptions, might not violate Plaintiff's due process rights, the 
application urged by the Defendant and believed by the lower court 
floes violate Plaintiff's due process rights. 
For some time, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that the Utah 
contractor licensing is intended to protect the general public from 
inept and financially irresponsible contractors. This might be a 
legitimate state interest under the state's police powers to 
protect the public health, safety and welfare. However, the blind 
application of Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 of the 
contractors licensing statute bears no reasonable relationship to 
that interest. Furthermore, such an application is overly broad 
to accomplish the stated purpose. There are many persons against 
tfhom the rule would be applied that would do nothing to further the 
state interest. 
It is undisputed herein that Plaintiff (or at least 
Plaintiff's predecessor) holds, and did hold at all relevant times, 
a valid contractors license. Under this license, Plaintiff 
qualified as to both financial responsibility and technical 
competence. Plaintiff's personnel were the same ones as those who 
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were qualified under the predecessor partnership. The Plaintiff 
was qualified to perform the work for which recovery is sought 
through arbitration. Thus, the legitimate state interest in 
protecting the public health, safety and welfare has already been 
accomplished under the facts of this case. Therefore, the 
application of the contractors licensing statutes and specifically 
Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11 to prevent recovery by 
Plaintiff in the present case is unconstitutionally arbitrary and 
over-broad. 
There are also very substantial constitutional questions 
regarding the Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11, which purports 
to take away Plaintiff's right to access to the courts. The Utah 
Constitution states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for 
injury done to him in his person, property, or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law, 
which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
Article I, Section 11. Furthermore, in the case of Christiansen 
v. Harris, 109 Utah 1, 163 P.2d 314 (1945), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
Many attempts have been made to further define "due 
process" but they all resolve into the thought that 
a party shall have his day in court -- that is each 
party shall have the right to a hearing before a 
competent court, with the privilege of being heard 
and introducing evidence to establish his or her 
defense, after which comes judgment upon the record 
thus made. 
Id. at 109 Utah 6, 7, 163 P.2d 316. 
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Thus, any attempt to prohibit Plaintiff from exercising its 
fundamental right to access to the courts of this State must fail 
as a violation of Plaintiff's due process rights and right to open 
courts. 
In determining whether there has been a violation of a 
person's rights to due process, the courts have distilled the issue 
down to one of fundamental fairness. In the case at bar, it would 
be fundamentally unfair to allow the Defendant to avoid its 
contract obligations to Plaintiff on the basis that there were at 
most technical problems with Plaintiff's contractors license. It 
would also be constitutionally prohibited and fundamentally unfair 
to wholly deprive Plaintiff access to the courts. 
CONCLUSION 
Under present Utah law, it was error for the lower court to 
enter an order granting summary judgment against Plaintiff whereby 
Plaintiff's right to recover damages and to specific performance 
of the arbitration provision of its contract has been wrongfully 
denied. Plaintiff now respectfully requests that this court, based 
on the authorities and arguments cited herein, reverse the lower 
court's judgment and remand the case for trial on the merits of the 
enforceability of the arbitration provision. It is clear from the 
language of the all of the relevant Utah Supreme Court cases that 
exceptions to the statutory bar contained in the Utah Contractor 
licensing statute apply in the present case. Defendant should not 
be able to avoid responsibility for resolving Plaintiff's 
legitimate claims on a purported technical defect in Plaintiff's 
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contractor's license. Furthermore, to apply Utah Code Annotated 
Section 58-50-11 mechanically and without resort to the equitable 
exceptions would be a violation of Plaintiff's due process rights 
as guaranteed by the United States and Utah Constitutions and would 
be a violation of Plaintiff's right to open courts as guaranteed 
by the Utah Constitution. 
DATED this 5th day of February. 
WALSTA&-& BABCOCK, P.C. 
Darrel J(^Bostwick 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
3-13-mckay2.brf 
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ADDENDUM 
Kooei"c f. uaococK (.#0158) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
185 South State, Suite 1000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
CtC 23 3 2SPH'88 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT C0UR 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH \J -i \ ' 
A.J. MACKAY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., 
Defendant. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No 
Plaintiff, for cause of action against Defendant, alleges as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff is a corporation authorized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Utah having its principal place of 
business in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant is a corporation authorized and existing under 
the laws of the State of Utah and being located in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
3. Plaintiff and Defendant entered into an agreement for 
construction services as part of the Utah Department of 
Transportation Project No. 1-215-9(72)10, West of Little 
Cottonwood Creek to West of 1300 East. 
4. Pursuant to said agreement, Defendant agreed to pay the 
sum of approximately $730,000. plus or minus the reasonable value 
of any work added to or deleted from the project. 
5. Plaintiff has duly performed all of the terms and 
conditions required of it under said agreement. 
6. Defendant has failed to perform pursuant to the said 
agreement and has breached the same by: 
(a) failing to pay a sum exceeding $240,000. which is due 
and owing Plaintiff by Defendant after all changes and 
credits have been added and deducted together with interest 
at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum; 
(b) causing Plaintiff damages for loss of efficiency in an 
amount exceeding $240,000. by using improper contract 
management procedures; 
(c) causing damage to Plaintiff in an amount to be 
determined at the hearing of this matter by failing to 
properly perform its duties and responsibilities as the prime 
contractor on the project; 
(d) causing damage to Plaintiff in an amount to be 
determined at the hearing of this matter by wrongfully 
requiring extra work and duties of the Plaintiff; 
(e) causing Plaintiff a loss of overhead and profit in an 
amount to be determined at the hearing of this matte as a 
result of the aforesaid breaches of the agreement. 
7. Section 7 of the agreements entitled Disputes, provides 
that any dispute concerning matters in connection with these 
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agreements, and without the scope of the work, then such dispute 
shall be settled by a ruling board of arbitration. 
8. Demand for arbitration was made upon Defendant on or 
about December 27, 1987, in writing. Defendant has failed and 
refused to enter into arbitration as required by the terms and 
conditions of the agreement. 
9. By reason of the failure and refusal of Defendant to 
render payment of the sums due Plaintiff, and to enter into 
arbitration under the terms and conditions of the Contract, it has 
been necessary for the Plaintiff to secure services of an attorney 
to represent it in this action. Defendant should be required to 
pay Plaintifffs attorney's fees and costs. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against the Defendant as 
follows: 
1. For an order that the Defendant be required to submit 
the matter to arbitration in accordance with the terms and 
conditions of the contract and the Utah Arbitration Act. 
2. For Plaintiff's attorney's fees incurred in this matter. 
3. For Plaintiff's costs of Court and such other and 
further relief as the Court deems proper in the premises. 
DATED this 2-f day of December, 1988. 
WALSTAD & BABC0CK 
Robert F. Babcock 
Plaintiff's Address: 
350 West Hartwell Ave. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115 
10-3-ajmacoak.cpl 
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WXLFORD A. BEESLEY 
STANFORD P. FITTS 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
300 Deseret Book Building 
40 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 538-2100 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A. J. MACKAY COMPANY, : 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
Plaintiff, : RICHARD T. LINDBERG 
vs. : 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, INC., : Civil No. C88-8250 
vTudge James S. Sawaya 
Defendant. : 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Affiant, Richard T. Lindberg, having been duly sworn, 
deposes and says: 
1. On or about February 1, 1984, plaintiff A. J. Mackay 
Company ("Mackay"), as subcontractor, entered into subcontract 
agreements with Okland, as general contractor, relating to Utah 
Department of Transportation project number 1-215-9(72)10, West 
of Little Cottonwood Creek to West of 13 00 East. The work on 
this project was completed in November of 1984. 
2. On or about December 28, 1988, Mackay served upon 
Okland its Complaint seeking arbitration of claims for payment 
for certain work allegedly performed by Plaintiff under the above 
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agreements• 
3. All damages claimed by Mackay, if any, against Okland 
result from acts of the Utah State Department of Transportation 
("UDOT"), and not of Okland, and all such claims pass through to 
UDOT and would be the subject of third-party claims by Okland 
against UDOT. 
4. The agreement between UDOT and Okland for construction 
of the above referenced project does not provide for resolution 
of disputes by arbitration. 
5. The granting of arbitration for resolving the issues and 
claims of plaintiff Mackay would result in duplicate proceedings 
and multiplicity of lawsuits between Mackay, Okland and UDOT. 
6. UDOT has indicated to Okland that it will not 
participate in any arbitration of Mackay's claims. 
7. Mackay has submitted its claims on the subject 
construction project directly to UDOT through Okland and, over a 
period of four years, has participated in negotiations with UDOT 
concerning such claims. 
8. The negotiations between Mackay, UDOT and Okland are 
without resolution pending documentation from Mackay to resolve 
UDOT concerns regarding Mackay's claims, including primarily 
concerns that Mackay's claims are the result of not adequately 
managing its work forces. 
9. Mackay has not provided any response or documentation 
regarding the concerns of UDOT and Okland concerning Mackay's 
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claims despite repeated requests over a period of more than four 
years. 
10. UDOT has withheld $48,600.00 from Okland as liquidated 
damages on the subject project due to failure of Mackay to timely 
complete its work. Okland has not withheld any amounts from 
Mackay under its agreements on the project. 
11. Okland has sought, over the past four years, the 
cooperation of Mackay in pursuing their claims against UDOT, 
including information relating to UDOT concerns that Mackay 
failed to adequately man its work forces, but Mackay has not 
provided such cooperation or information. 
12. Mackay has not provided any written notice of alleged 
deficiencies in Oklandfs work impacting the work of Mackay and 
has given no written notice of additional or extra work within 
one week of completion of the work. No written addendum to the 
agreejaaats exist relative to the claims of Mackay. 
Commission ^ \ //« / // / - ^ ^V^ 
JOHN McEflTtffS I Ri&hard T. Lindberg 7 / 
«
A78So.W.Tempie // ^ 
Salt take City J?/j 
UT d4115 *^/f _ . 
ibed and sworn to before me this day of January, 
1989. 
My Commission Expires: 04^-*- u^ c'^-'^z— 
Notary Public 
^-1C--C)Z Residing at.-SLd, ^Tfhi 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to be hand delivered to the following this jj^ day of 
January, 1989: 
Robert F. Babcock, Esq. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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i i State of Utah 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
William E. Dunn 
Executive Director 
David E. Robinson 
Ofviak>n Director 
DEPARTMENT OF BUSINESS REGULATION 
Division of Occupational & Professional Licensing 
Heber M Wells Building 
160 East 300 South/P 0 Box 45802 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0802 
801-530-6628 
CERTIFICATE OF CUSTODIAN OF RECORDS 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that a diligent search made of all records maintained 
by the Utah State Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing, 
reveals whether an official contractors license has ever been issued to: 
A. J. Mackay Company, a corporation, and whether such license, if any, is 
current or has expired. 
It is hereby certified that license no. 39131-5 was issued by this office 
for said licensee on May 31, 1985 with the classifications 1100 General 
Engineering and 3030 Demolition & Wrecking. Said license is current. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am a public officer of the State of Utah by 
virtue of Title 58 U.C.A. 1953, as amended, and that I am the legal keeper 
and custodian of all records pertaining to the Utah State Division of 
Occupational and Professional Licensing and if such records do exist anywhere 
they would be in my control and possession. 
This certificate is made for use as court evidence or otherwise in 
compliance with RULE 44(a) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have attached my seal of office this 29th. day of 
December, 1988. 
orge P . ~WeiIer,"Ticense CoordlTlErdJr 
tah State D iv is ion of Occupational 
and Professional Licensing 
/ U  
EXHIBITS 
Robert F. Babcock (#0158) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
FEB ? 2 3SPHTI9 
TH'°' 1,, -i i . DISTRICT 
SALTYAM COUNTY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN K^B^BKR^^^^^L 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A.J. MACKAY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, : 
INC., 
Defendant. 
: AFFIDAVIT OF 
JOHN HENRY McCAUGHEY 
: Civil No. C88-8250 
: Judge James S. Sawaya 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John Henry McCaughey, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says: 
1. The affiant is over 21 years of age and an officer in A. 
J. Mackay Company and as such is knowledgeable about the subject 
matter of the instant action. 
2. On or about February 1, 1984, A. J. Mackay Company 
("Mackay") entered into subcontracts with Okland Construction 
Company ("Okland") for work on a project for the Utah Department 
of Transportation ("UDOT") known as West of Little Cottonwood 
Creek to West of 1300 East ("Project"). 
3. Because Okland had subcontracted out more than was 
allowable by UDOT, Okland asked Mackay to perform the work 
pursuant to the subcontracts, and not be listed as a subcontractor 
to UDOT, but rather be on the payroll of Okland with the payments 
being adjusted per the unit prices of the subcontracts so as to 
allow Okland to come into compliance with the UDOT requirements. 
4. Mackay began doing business in 1979, as a partnership 
jnder the name of A.J. Mackay & Sons. It was later incorporated 
ander the name of A.J. Mackay Company. Mackay obtained a 
contractor's license in the name of A.J. Mackay & Sons in 1979, 
and continued to renew the license in that name until May 1985 
fhen the name on the contractor's license was changed to reflect 
:he change in the corporate name. The delay in changing the name 
:>n the license was due simply to the fact that it had been 
Inadvertently overlooked. 
5. Mackay has been having sporadic discussions with Okland 
md UDOT regarding the claims which are the subject matter of this 
Lawsuit since during the performance of the work in 1984, and 
continuing to the present, the most recent being a meeting with 
ill parties and counsel present in October, 1988, which again 
jroved unfruitful in reaching any resolution. Some of those 
liscussions have involved only Mackay and Okland while others, at 
)klandfs request, have included UDOT. 
6. Mackay has submitted documentation on its claims to 
)kland but Okland has never been satisfied with the documentation 
>rovided. 
7. Mackay's claims involve principally the failure of Okland 
:o dewater the site and to properly manage and coordinate the work 
>n the subject project. 
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8. Okland would like to have UDOT contribute because Okland 
believes there was more water on the site than parties had 
reasonably anticipated. 
9. That he makes these statements of his own knowledge. 
DATED this 'iftv day of February, 1989. 
1989. 
Johpi Henry McC^ aughey 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 7li? day of February, 
*s\i\C*^ O \Ap^^S^ 
UOTKB/r PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: Residing At: 
rfb-ajmack.aff 
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Robert F. Babcock (#0158) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7000 
FlL£fl 8!STBiOT C6LQT 
Third Judicial District 
FEB 8 1989 
SALXbWE COON 
IT puty Clark 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A.J. MACKAY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
OPPOSITION 
FOR vs. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO COMPEL 
ARBITRATION; IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
C O U N T E R C L A I M S ; AND IN 
: TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
: PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, : 
INC., : 
Defendant. : 
: Civil No. C88-8250 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
Plaintiff A,J. Mackay Company ("Mackay"), by and through its 
counsel of record herein, hereby submits this Memorandum In 
Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to Compel 
Arbitration served concurrently herewith in the above entitled 
matter. Plaintiff states as follows: 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. On or about February 1, 1984, Plaintiff, as 
subcontractor, entered into subcontract agreements with Defendant 
Okland Construction Company, Inc., as Contractor under which 
Plaintiff was to perform services and to provide equipment 
pursuant to the construction of Utah Department of Transportation 
project number 1-215-9(72)10 ("the project"), located West of 
Little Cottonwood Creek to West of 1300 East. 
2. At the time the contracts were entered into, Plaintiff 
was duly licensed under the laws of the State of Utah to perform 
services as a construction contractor, under the name of "A.J. 
Mackay & Sons." Prior to commencing work on the project, 
Plaintiff lawfully incorporated its business and changed its name 
to A.J. Mackay Company while continuing to operate with the same 
personnel and management, and under the same contractor's license. 
3. Plaintiff has submitted documentation in support of its 
claims for compensation to Defendant. During the course of 
construction and thereafter Plaintiff, Defendant and UDOT have had 
numerous meetings and exchanged documents regarding Plaintiff's 
claims for extra compensation such that any claim by Defendant 
that it did not receive adequate notice of the problems 
encountered by Plaintiff is frivolous and without merit. While 
the dialogue between the parties has been sporadic since the 
completion of the project, all parties know that the dispute has 
never been resolved. 
4. Completion of the project was delayed, and the 
continuity thereof disrupted as a result of the failure of 
Defendant to perform all of its obligations including adequately 
dewatering the site to allow Plaintiff to perform its work as 
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contemplated by the subcontracts. Plaintiff has made demand on 
Defendant to arbitrate the disputes and the damages resulting 
therefrom, which demand has been denied by Defendant in breach of 
the subcontracts. 
5. Because Defendant has refused to honor its contract and 
arbitrate Plaintiff's claims, Plaintiff instigated this action on 
or about December 28, 1988 seeking arbitration of claims for 
payment for certain work performed by Plaintiff which was above 
and beyond the scope of the subcontracts which are the subject of 
this action. 
6. The subcontracts contain an arbitration provision which 
Plaintiff seeks to enforce by summary judgment issued by this 
court. The arbitration provision contained in the subcontracts is 
applicable to Plaintiff's claims for extra compensation in this 
case. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
I. ISSUES RELEVANT TO THE ENFORCEABILITY OF AN ARBITRATION 
PROVISION SHOULD BE DECIDED BY SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
It is widely held that where one party to a contract seeks to 
enforce an arbitration agreement contained therein, and the other 
party contends that the agreement does not apply to the disputed 
claims, the court should decide the issues of enforceability of 
the provision by summary adjudication. And, if the court finds 
for the moving party, the court should order arbitration. 
American National Bank of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing Authority, 
562 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1977). In the present case, both parties have 
moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of the 
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enforceability of the arbitration provision of the subject 
subcontracts• By weight of authority, public policy and the 
undisputed facts of this case the enforceability of the subject 
provisions is the proper subject of summary judgment which should 
issue in favor of Plaintiff, 
II. PLAINTIFF WAS AT ALL TIMES DULY LICENSED UNDER THE LAWS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH TO PERFORM CONSTRUCTION SERVICES 
PURSUANT TO THE SUBJECT SUBCONTRACTS. 
Defendant, in an effort to avoid honoring its contract 
obligations, has raised the argument that Plaintiff was not duly 
licensed to provide construction services on the subject project 
so that its claims to enforce the subcontract provisions are 
barred by the applicable Utah Contractor Licensing statute. This 
argument is without merit in that Plaintiff has at all times 
relevant to this contract held a valid contractors license and 
has every remedy at law or in equity available to it to enforce 
its contractual and other rights. The fact that Plaintiff 
incorporated its construction company and changed its name from 
"A.J. Mackay & Sons" to "A.J. Mackay Company" does not invalidate 
its contractor's license. Nor does the fact of the reorganization 
defeat or frustrate the purposes for which the licensing statute 
was enacted. 
Utah has long followed the general common-law rule of 
requiring compliance with the licensing statutes as a prerequisite 
to recovery for services requiring a license. See Olsen v. Reese, 
114 Utah 411, 200 P. 2d 733 (1948) and Mosley v. Johnson. 22 
Utah 2d 348, 453 P. 2d 149 (1969). However, several exceptions to 
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the general rule were created by the Utah Supreme Court which 
allowed a person who was not licensed as required by statute to 
prevail in a suit to collect monies due. The Utah Supreme Court 
referring to the afore-mentioned rule has stated, "Our common law 
rule [is] not mechanically applied. Rather this Court under the 
old statute considered the merits of each particular case so as to 
avoid unreasonable penalties and forfeitures." Loader v. Scott 
Construction Corporation. 681 P. 2d 1227, 1229 (Utah 1984). In 
the case of Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving, 
561 P. 2d 687, 689 (Utah 1977), quoting Corbin on Contracts, Vol. 
6A, Sec. 1512, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
Although many courts yearn for a mechanically applicable 
rule, they have not made one in the present instance. 
Justice requires that the penalty should fit the crime; and 
justice and sound policy do not always require the 
enforcement of the licensing statutes by large forfeitures 
going not to the state but repudiating defendants. 
The Court also stated that "This court has not applied the 
general rule of denying relief to unlicensed persons mentioned 
above inflexibly or too broadly." I^d. See also Lignell v. Berg. 
593 P. 2d 800 (Utah 1979). Further, the Court said: 
The parties should be able to present their positions to the 
court because under the facts of this case-which are 
undisputed concerning whether the general rule supra ought to 
be applied -- the law intended for protecting the public 
might become "an unwarranted shield for the avoidance of a 
just obligation." 
Fillmore at 690 (quoting in part Matchett v. Gould. 13! Cal. 
App. 2d 821, 281 P. 2d 524 (1955)). 
It is due to the harshness of the general rule and the 
penalty or forfeiture which the strict application of the general 
5 
rule will produce that the Utah Supreme Court has carved out 
several exceptions to the general rule. The fundamental princi-
ples upon which the Court has relied in creating the exceptions 
are: 
(1) The licensing statutes are in place to protect the 
general public against technically incompetent and finan-
cially irresponsible contractors and, therefore, a person not 
within the protected class under the statute will not be 
allowed to assert the defense; and 
(2) Even if the person claiming the defense is within the 
protected class under the statute, if adequate protection of 
the person in the protected class is provided by some way 
other than the licensing statutes, the general rule will not 
be applied. 
In 1981, the Utah legislature codified the common law general 
rule at Utah Code Annotated Section 58A-1-26. That section 
states: 
No contractor may act as agent or commence or maintain any 
action in any court of the state for collection of 
compensation for the performance of any act for which a 
license is required by this chapter without alleging and 
proving that he was a properly licensed contractor when the 
contract sued upon was entered into and when the alleged 
cause of action arose. 
In 1985, the Utah legislature recodified the section at Section 
58A-la-13 and in 1987 the Utah legislature again recodified the 
section at Utah Code Annotated Section 58-50-11. 
The Utah Supreme Court, has had only one occasion to apply 
the new statute. See Wilderness Building Systems. Inc. v. 
Chapman, 699 P. 2d 766 (Utah 1985). Although the Court ultimately 
held that the claimant was barred from recovery, it analyzed the 
new statute within the framework of several of the common law 
general rule exceptions which had been pled by the unlicensed 
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contractor. Thus, in light of Wilderness Building Systems, it is 
obvious that the common law exceptions still apply to the rule 
that an unlicensed contractor is barred from recovery as stated in 
Utah Code Annotated Section 58A-la-13. 
There are at least two of the exceptions to the general rule 
which are applicable to this case and which compel a denial of the 
Defendant's motion. First, an unlicensed contractor may recover 
for work performed if it was under the control of a licensed 
contractor. See Fillmore Products. Inc. v. Western States 
Paving, 561 P. 2d 687 (Utah 1977); Motivated Management 
International v. Finney. 604 P. 2d 467 (Utah 1979); Kinkella v. 
Baugh, 660 P. 2d 233 (Utah 1983); George v. Oren Limited & 
Associates. 672 P. 2d 732 (Utah 1983); and Wilderness Building 
Systems, Inc. v. Chapman, 699 P. 2d 766 (Utah 1985). Second, 
where the contractor has been previously licensed and the license 
has lapsed through inadvertence and not for cause or through 
deliberate rebellion to the licensing statutes, recovery by an 
unlicensed contractor is permitted. See Lignell v. Berg. 593 P. 
2d 800 (Utah 1979); and Loader v. Scott Construction Corporation, 
681 P. 2d 1227 (Utah 1984). 
In the case at bar, the Plaintiff's work was supervised, 
inspected and approved by a properly licenced contractor, 
Defendant Okland Construction Company, Inc. Furthermore, the 
uncontroverted evidence is that the failure to change, the name on 
Plaintiff?s contractor's license was inadvertent. The strict 
application of the rule against recovery would not be appropriate 
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in this case for an additional reason. The owner of the project 
is UDOT, a sophisticated owner that does not need the same level 
of protection from "unlicensed" contractors as does the general 
public. 
The facts of this case are that Plaintiff held a contractors 
license, but inadvertently failed to change the name until after 
entering subcontracts with Defendant. Therefore, under the 
policies of the Utah Supreme Court and the Utah State contractor's 
licensing authority Plaintiff should be allowed to maintain its 
action, and should be granted summary judgment to compel 
arbitration. 
III. THE DISPUTED CLAIMS BETWEEN PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT ARE 
SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION EVEN THOUGH THEY TANGENTIALLY 
INVOLVE THE OWNER. 
Defendant argues, in the case at bar, that enforcement of the 
arbitration agreement will materially prejudice its interest 
because UDOT has refused to participate in the arbitration. 
Defendant also argues that arbitration is unenforceable in that 
even if Defendant is liable to Plaintiff for failure to dewater 
and for failure to pay for work performed beyond the scope of the 
subcontracts, Plaintiff's claims should be passed through to UDOT 
who, Defendant asserts, is ultimately liable. On the basis of 
these two arguments, Defendant hopes to avoid enforcement of the 
arbitration provision. 
Defendant's argument is fatally flawed as a matter of law in 
two important respects: (1) few, if any, of Plaintiff's claims 
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will pass through to UDOT, and (2) UDOT's participation or lack 
thereof in the arbitration is irrelevant and immaterial to the 
resolution of Plaintiff's claims, and Defendant's counterclaims. 
At the present stage of this case, UDOT is not a named party 
in interest to the litigation. Therefore, there are no claims by 
either party to the litigation which can affect the rights of UDOT 
in anyway. The essence of the litigation is a claim for breach of 
the Subcontract, to which UDOT is not a party. Therefore, the 
dispute to be resolved by arbitration is between Plaintiff and 
Defendant, and in no way involves UDOT as a separate entity or 
interested party. 
Obviously UDOT personnel will be called upon to give 
testimony relevant to the issues raised at the arbitration. But 
UDOT's participation as a party to the arbitration is not required 
to protect the parties to the Subcontract here in question. If 
Defendant intends to recover damages against UDOT for breach of 
the prime contract, Defendant should sue UDOT on the merits of its 
Dwn claims, and pursue all of its legal remedies at its peril just 
as Plaintiff is having to do in the present action. 
In support of the contention that UDOT' s participation in the 
arbitration is immaterial to the resolution of the dispute between 
Plaintiff and Defendant, court's in several jurisdictions have 
concluded that where the dispute to be resolved is between the 
contractor and its subcontractor, arbitration is appropriate even 
Lf it will touch on the interests or involvement of the owner. 
7or example, in In re Arbitration of W.A. Bottinq Plumbing v. 
9 
Constructors-Pamco, 47 Wash.App. 681, 736 P.2d 1100 (1987) the 
Washington Court of Appeals upheld the enforcement of an 
arbitration agreement in a case factually similar to the one at 
bar. In Botting the dispute was as to a unit price adjustment for 
material to be supplied by the subcontractor, which dispute was 
covered by the arbitration provision of the subcontract. The 
contractor argued that, because the adjustment was to be agreed to 
by the Contractor, the Engineer and the Owner, the subcontractor's 
failure to obtain mutual agreement before seeking payment of a 
higher unit price was in breach of the contract and therefore the 
arbitration board erred in awarding extra compensation to the 
subcontractor. Following the arbitration, Pamco submitted a 
memorandum to the arbitrator contesting the award on several 
grounds, including the arbitrator's lack of jurisdiction. Pamco 
argued that where the dispute involved parties in addition to the 
contractor and subcontractor, it was not subject to the 
arbitration agreement. The arbitration was reopened, and after 
consideration of arguments from both sides, the award to the 
subcontractor was sustained and ratified by the trial court. On 
appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's decision upholding 
the award to the subcontractor. In reaching that result, the 
Court stated the basic rule as to the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements as follows: 
.the contract provides for arbitration of disputes 
arising between the contractor, Pamco, and the sub-
contractor, Botting. In determining whether the parties have 
agreed to arbitrate a dispute the balance is weighted in 
favor of arbitration. 
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In support of this general conclusion, the Court relied on 
the United States Supreme Court decision in Mitsubishi Motors 
Corp, v, Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 
3346, 3354 (1985) wherein the Supreme Court held that "the 
parties' intentions control, but those intentions are generously 
construed as to issues of arbitrability." 
The Botting Court also found that "Washington courts have 
held that a court's inquiry into arbitrability is finished when a 
complaint on its face calls for an interpretation of the 
agreement. . . .The inquiry into whether or not each of the items 
in dispute indeed involved a party other than the 
contractor/subcontractor is a factual determination best left to 
the arbitrator." 
This reasoning is the premise underlying the court's 
conclusion that the contractor's "assertion that the fact that the 
dispute involves more parties than the contractor and 
subcontractor automatically precludes the triggering of the 
arbitration clause is not well taken." The Botting Court 
correctly concurred with the U.S. Court of Appeals and held that 
"even if the rights of [the contractor] cannot be vindicated 
without consideration of the owner's . . . actions, this dispute 
is between only two parties, the prime contractor and the sub-
contractor." In re Arbitration of W.A. Botting Plumbing and 
Heating v. Constructors-PAMCO, 47 Wash.App. 736 P.2d 1100, 1102 
(1987)(citing United States ex rel. Newton v. Neumann Caribbean 
Int'l, Ltd., 750 F.2d 1422 (9th Cir. 1985).) 
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A. UDOT's participation in the arbitration is irrelevant where 
the disputed claims pertain only to the subcontracts. 
Plaintiff, as Defendant has laboriously pointed out, has made 
claims for payment for extra work performed in connection with the 
completion of the subject project. As regards those claims for 
payment, Defendant has both refused to make payment to Plaintiff 
and raised specific counterclaims alleging Plaintiff's breach of 
the subcontracts by inter alia delay in completion of the project 
and for negligently managing its work forces. But what Defendant 
has failed to realize is that all of its counterclaims allege 
causes of action against Plaintiff for breach of the subcontracts 
and do not in any way allege or imply that UDOT is in anyway 
liable for damages either to Plaintiff or Defendant. Plaintiff is 
suing here to enforce its rights under the subcontract against 
Defendant. Plaintiff seeks redress of its claims against 
Defendant under the specific terms of the subcontracts which apply 
only to Plaintiff and Defendant and not to UDOT. Therefore, UDOT 
is not an indispensible party to the arbitration as suggested by 
Defendant. Under the reasoning of Batting, which is a logical 
extension of the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Lindon City, 636 
P. 2d 1070 (Utah 1981) upholding the freedom to contract and the 
general rule favoring enforcement of agreements to arbitrate, 
Plaintiff should be allowed to arbitrate its claims against 
Defendant regardless of UDOT's participation in the arbitration. 
If it is determined at the arbitration that any or all of 
Plaintiff's claims are "pass through" claims to UDOT,' then 
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Defendant will have to seek reimbursement through whatever legal 
means are available to it against UDOT as the owner of the 
project. Public policy favors arbitration as being in the best 
interest of judicial economy and justice. 
IV. THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF AUTHORITY AND PUBLIC POLICY 
FAVOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRATION PROVISIONS IN CASES 
SUCH AS THE ONE AT BAR. 
It is settled in Utah that "Arbitration is a remedy freely 
bargained for by the parties, and 'provides a means of giving 
effect to the intention of the parties, easing court congestion, 
and providing a method more expeditious and less expensive for the 
resolution of disputes.'" Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady 
Systems, Inc., 731 P. 2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986), and perhaps more 
importantly that, "There is no public policy or other reason to 
prevent parties from agreeing to arbitration." Lindon City v. 
Engineers Const. Co. , 636 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1981). In the 
case at bar the only real issue as to the enforceability of the 
arbitration provision under Utah law is whether Plaintiff's claims 
are properly within the reach of the arbitration agreements. As 
to determining the scope of agreements to arbitrate, the United 
States Supreme Court has also concluded that "the parties' 
intentions control, but those intentions are generously construed 
as to issues of arbitrability." Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler 
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 105 S.Ct. 3346, 3354 
(1985)(cited supra.). 
A* Public Policy: Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-31a-l et. seq. (1953). 
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The Utah State Legislature has defined the public policy 
regarding the enforceability of arbitration agreements by passage 
of the Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code Annotated § 78-31a-l et. 
seq. (1953)(as amended), Subsection 78-31a-3, entitled "Court 
order to arbitrate" provides that: 
A written agreement to submit any existing or future 
controversy to arbitration is valid, enforceable, and 
irrevocable, except upon grounds existing at law or equity to 
set aside the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as provided 
in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Subsection 78-31a-4, further provides that: 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the 
existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the 
parties to arbitrate* If an issue is raised concerning the 
existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of the 
matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine 
those issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly. 
The standardized (form) subcontract documents here in 
question, prepared by Defendant and signed by Defendant and 
Plaintiff provide respectively in section 7 as follows: 
In the event of any dispute between the Contractor and 
Subcontractor covering the scope of the work, the dispute 
shall be settled in the manner provided by the contract 
documents. If none be provided, or if there arises any 
dispute concerning matters in connection with this agreement, 
and without the scope of the work, then such disputes shall 
be settled by a ruling of a board of arbitration . . . . 
Defendant contends that this provision does not apply because the 
prime contract documents provide for a manner of settling 
disputes. In support of that contention Defendant incorrectly 
relies on section 105.17 of the prime contract which merely 
requires the prime contractor to provide written notice to UDOT of 
its intention to claim compensation for extra work, and it 
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prescribes penalty for failing to provide the proper written 
notice. Nowhere does that provision set forth any method 
whatsoever for the resolution of disputes between the contractor 
and the subcontractor. Defendant's assertion is without merit in 
that the section of the prime contract on which it relies does not 
preempt either explicitly or otherwise the arbitration clause 
contained in the subcontracts. 
Defendant next contends that the arbitration provision of the 
subcontract does not apply in that the prime contract provisions 
contain by implication a dispute resolution scheme purportedly 
provided by the Utah Procurement Act, Utah Code Annotated § 63-56-
1 et. seq. (1953)(as amended). Defendant specifically argues that 
because the prime contract is subject to the requirements of the 
Procurement Code, any dispute resolution scheme provided therein 
preempts the subcontract arbitration provision. However, 
Defendant's argument is both misguided and entirely inappropriate 
in that it relies specifically on Utah Code Annotated § 63-56-45 
et. seq. as the preemptory dispute resolution procedure. UCA 
Section 63-56-45 provides as follows: 
63-56-45. Protest to chief procurement officer-Time 
Authority to resolve protest. 
(1) Any actual or prospective bidder, offeror, or contractor 
who is aggrieved in connection with the solicitation or award 
of a contract may protest to the chief procurement officer or 
the head of a purchasing agency . . .(emphasis added). 
This statute applies only to a contractor who has been 
purportedly wronged during the state's bidding and award process. 
The provisions cited by Defendant have no bearing whatsoever, 
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either by implication or otherwise, on the resolution of disputes 
between a subcontractor and the prime contractor on subcontracts 
which have been substantially, if not completely performed, and to 
which the state is not a party. Even if the Utah Procurement Act 
did apply to the subcontracts, Defendant has failed to cite a 
provision thereof which in any way resembles a dispute resolution 
procedure applicable by reference to the prime contract between 
UDOT and Defendant, which could deny Plaintiff the protection of 
the arbitration provision of the subcontracts. Defendant's 
argument as to the applicability of the Utah Procurement Code 
falls well short of a legitimate bar to enforcing the arbitration 
provision. It is reasonably clear that the prime contract 
documents contain no provision for resolution of disputes on the 
contract so that if any arbitrable issues exist, Plaintiff is 
entitled to arbitrate its claims. 
B. Arbitrability of Disputed Claims 
Defendant has raised no issue of material fact as to the 
existence of an agreement to arbitrate between itself and 
Plaintiff. Therefore, under the provisions of the Utah 
Arbitration Act, the court is bound to order the parties to 
arbitrate. The only issue left open for determination by the 
court in this motion, is the scope of the matters which are 
subject to the terms of the arbitration agreement. This 
determination is essentially one of construction of a specific 
term of the contract and should therefore limit the court deciding 
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the issue of arbtitrability to the traditional rules of contract 
construction, including but not limited to construing any 
ambiguity against the drafter (Defendant), interpreting the 
contract so as to best accomplish the intent of the parties upon 
making the contract and the rule favoring arbitration. 
As regards arbitration agreements specifically, The Utah 
Supreme Court in Lindon City, supra., stated that "Doubts as to 
whether the content of a contract is arbitrable should be resolved 
in favor of the parties1 freedom to contract." Id. at 1073. In 
making this statement, the Utah Court relies on the language of 
King County v. Boeing Company, 18 Wash. App. 595, 570 P.2d 713 
(1977) wherein the Washington Court of Appeals holds that: 
Arbitration clauses should be liberally interpreted when the 
issue contested is the scope of the clause. If the scope of 
an arbitration clause is debatable or reasonably in doubt, 
the clause should be construed in favor of arbitration unless 
it can be said that it is not susceptible to an 
interpretation that covers the asserted dispute. . . . If an 
arbitrable issue exists, the parties should not be deprived 
of the benefits of the agreement for which they bargained. 
King County v. Boeing Co., 570 P.2d 713, 717-718 (Wash. App. 
1977)(cited in Lindon City at 1073). See also, Docutel Olivetti 
Corp. v. Dick Brady Systems, 731 P.2d 475 (Utah 1986). See also, 
American National Bank of Denver v. Cheyenne Housing Authority, 
562 P.2d 1017 (Wyo. 1977)(Party should not be required to litigate 
disputes which are subject to arbitration agreement, and there is 
national policy to effect that doubts are to be resolved in favor 
of arbitrability.); In re arbitration of W.A. Botting Plumbing 
and Heating Co. and Constructors-PAMCO, 47 Wash.App. 681, 736 P.2d 
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1100 (1987)(In determining whether parties have agreed to 
arbitrate dispute, balance is weighed in favor of arbitration.)• 
Defendant attempts to raise doubts as to the arbitrability of 
Plaintiff's claims by arguing that Plaintiff failed to satisfy 
conditions precedent to the enforcement of the arbitration 
provision by failing to provide timely written notice of its 
claims for extra compensation related to Contractors failure to 
properly perform. Specifically, Defendant relies on sections 2 
and 6 of the subcontracts. Defendant argues that Plaintiff has at 
no time made satisfactory written notice, so as to protect 
Plaintiff's right to arbitrate. Plaintiff, in turn has stated 
that timely and adequate notice was received by Defendant so that 
the disputed claims are now ripe for adjudication by arbitration. 
See Affidavit of John Henry McCaughey. 
The arbitration clause provides that "In the event of any 
dispute between the Contractor and Subcontractor covering the 
scope of the work . . . . shall be settled by a ruling of a board 
of arbitration . . . " (emphasis added). This provision makes no 
reference to the notice requirements on which Defendant relies to 
avoid arbitration. While it is reasonable to expect that the 
contractor may assert a defense as to the timeliness of the notice 
of claims for extra compensation during the arbitration process 
that is the place to determine the merits to the defense after 
hearing all of the evidence as to notice issue. The notice 
requirement should not be litigated now as a precondition to 
arbitrating the claims. 
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Closer examination of the subcontract provisions on which 
Defendant relies in asserting that Plaintiff's failure to provide 
timely written notice of its claims, reveals that nowhere do said 
provisions state that failure to comply with the notice 
requirements is a waiver of Plaintiff's rights under the 
arbitration provision of section 7 of the subcontracts. The 
arbitration agreements are not dependant upon notice of any kind 
and is the best evidence of the parties intent to arbitrate any 
and all disputes arising under the subcontracts for extra work 
performed by the subcontractor, 
V- CONCLUSION 
Defendant has failed to raise an issue of fact by way of its 
pleadings, and affidavits on file with the court, of sufficient 
materiality so as to defeat the proper construction of the 
subcontract arbitration agreements. Plaintiff is therefore 
entitled to a summary judgment to compel arbitration of its claims 
according to the terms of the contract as a matter of law. The 
weight of authority in the Utah courts, and public policy as 
decided by the Utah State Legislature strongly supports the 
validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreements at issue 
in this case. Plaintiff respectfully moves that this Court grant 
Plaintiff summary judgment and issue an order to compel the 
arbitration of Plaintiffs claims. Furthermore, Defendant's motion 
is misguided, frivolous, without merit and in bad faith as to the 
material issues in this case and should not have been brought. 
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Plaintiff has incurred substantial costs in defending against 
Defendant's motion. Plaintiff therefore prays, in addition to an 
order to compel the arbitration of Plaintiff's claims, for 
attorney's fees and costs of court along with all other awards 
which the court deems just and appropriate. 
DATED this b day of February, 1989. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C. 
By (M/^ u yf (fiiXu>J<-
Robert F. Babcock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY HAND DELIVERY 
I HEREBY certify that on this (,; - day of February, 1989, I 
hand delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM 
IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO COMPEL 
ARBITRATION; IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO DISMISS 
COUNTERCLAIMS; AND IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to the following: 
Wilford A. Beesley 
BEESLEY & FAIRCLOUGH 
Attorneys for Defendant 
310 Deseret Book Building 
40 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
ddAU £ J&x-
JRP-1/MEMSJX.222 
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Third Judicial District 
Robert F. Babcock (#0158) 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C. 
Attorneys for 
254 West 400 South, #200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John Henry McCaughey, being duly sworn upon oath, deposes and 
says that: 
1. That A. J. Mackay & Sons and its successor A. J. Mackay 
Company have had a long history of working for Okland 
Construction• 
2. That A. J. Mackay & Sons was a partnership prior to being 
incorporated in 1979. At the time it was incorporated the name 
was changed to A. J. Mackay Company. 
3. The company inadvertently failed to change the name on 
its contractor's license until it was renewed in 1985. 
4. There has only been one company and one contractor's 
license for that company since 1979 although there was admittedly 
MAR 1 1989 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
an inadvertent delay in changing the name over on the contractor's 
license. 
5. Tne cnange in.the name was simply that a name change* A 
new license was no~c oo'camea in JL^OO OUT: ratner -cne name was 
simply changed from A, J. Mackay & Sons to A. J. Mackay Company* 
6* That Okland was required by the terms of its contract 
with the Utah Department of Transportation to not subcontract more 
than 50% of the contract. Okland in reality wanted to subcontract 
more than 50% of the work. Okland therefore requested that A. J. 
Mackay Company cooperate in giving the appearance to UDOT that A. 
J. Mackay was not a subcontractor but rather that Okland was 
leasing equipment from A. J. Mackay Company. In addition, A. J. 
Mackay Company's superintendent was on the payroll of Okland. 
7. That between Okland and A. J. Mackay Company there was 
never any question that the subcontracts were the controlling 
contract documents. All payments to the superintendent were 
deducted from the progress billings to A. J. Mackay Company. 
8. That the significance of the last two facts in this 
proceeding is simply to show that there existed a working 
relationship between the parties that evidences the fact that 
Okland was not concerned about the license status and is not part 
of the class of people intended to be protected by the licensing 
statute. 
DATED this j2^ //fday of February, 1989. 
JOHN HENRY McCAUGHEY 
-2-
VN >'j // 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this Z/ djay /ofV February, 
1989. 
NOTARY' PUBLIC V ^ V - • 7 
Residing At: '",.'' J •'--'" My Commission Expires 
rfb-mackay.aff 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
A.J. MACKAY COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
OKLAND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
INC., 
Defendant. 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. C88-8250 
Judge James S. Sawaya 
COMES NOW Plaintiff, by and through its counsel of record and 
hereby submits this reply memorandum of in support of its Motion 
for Summary Judgment to Compel arbitration and in opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeking to dismiss 
Plaintiff's claims and to avoid arbitration. In addition to 
Plaintiff's Memorandum of Points and Authorities already on file 
with the Court, Plaintiff further states as follows: 
VJT v-/ W # sf*m •'—»• 
Supplemental Statement of Material Facts 
1. At all times during the course of construction, 
Plaintiff's work under the subcontracts and otherwise was subject 
to the inspection and approval of both Defendant, a licensed 
contractor, and UDOT neither or which are members of the general 
public, and both of which are sophisticated, construction 
contracting entities. 
2. Plaintiff was a responsible contractor at all times 
material to the performance of the subcontracts in question. 
There was at no time during the course of the subject contracts a 
risk that Plaintiff, in any way posed any type of danger to the 
general public, to the Defendant or to UDOT. 
3. There are no provisions of either the Subcontract or the 
Prime Contract which preclude enforcement of the Arbitration 
agreement contained in the subcontracts. 
4. That A. J. Mackay & Sons and its successor A. J. Mackay 
Company have had a long history of working for Okland 
Construction. 
5. That A. J. Mackay & Sons was a partnership prior to being 
incorporated in 1979. At the time it was incorporated the name 
was changed to A. J. Mackay Company. 
6. The company inadvertently failed to change the name on 
its contractor's license until it was renewed in 1985. 
7. There has only been one company and one contractor's 
license for that company since 1979 although there was admittedly 
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an inadvertent delay in changing the name over on the contractor's 
license. 
8. The change in the name was simply that a name change. A 
new license was not obtained in 1985 but rather the name was 
simply changed from A. J. Mackay & Sons to A. J. Mackay Company. 
9. That Okland was required by the terms of its contract 
with the Utah Department of Transportation to not subcontract more 
than 50% of the contract. Okland in reality wanted to subcontract 
more than 50% of the work. Okland therefore requested that A. J. 
Mackay Company cooperate in giving the appearance to UDOT that A. 
J. Mackay was not a subcontractor but rather that Okland was 
leasing equipment from A. J. Mackay Company. In addition, A. J. 
Mackay Company's superintendent was on the payroll of Okland. 
10. That between Okland and A. J. Mackay Company there was 
never any question that the subcontracts were the controlling 
contract documents. All payments to the superintendent were 
deducted from the progress billings to A. J. Mackay Company. 
11. That the significance of the last two facts in this 
proceeding is simply to show that there existed a working 
relationship between the parties that evidences the fact that 
Okland was not concerned about the license status and is not part 
of the class of people intended to be protected by the licensing 
statute. 
Supplemental Statement of Points and Authorities 
I. APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE EXCEPTIONS TO THE STATUTORY BAR OF 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED § 58-50-11 DOES NOT FRUSTRATE THE 
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PURPOSE, NOR THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND THE UTAH 
CONTRACTOR LICENSING STATUTE. SUCH EXCEPTIONS ARE STILL 
VALID WHERE THEY HAVE NOT BEEN REPEALED BY LEGISLATIVE ACTION 
OR REJECTED BY EXPRESS COURT RULING. 
Defendant's contention that this action by Plaintiff to 
enforce the arbitration agreement in the subject subcontracts is 
barred by Plaintiff's failure to be properly licensed as provided 
by the Utah Contractor's Licensing statute, Utah Code Annotated § 
58A-la-13 (Recodified at 58-50-11 1985), is without merit. The 
Utah Supreme Court has spoken and clarified the policy to be 
followed in this state regarding the licensing of contractor's. 
Defendant has blatantly failed and avoided to address the opinion 
of the Utah Supreme Court in Wilderness Building Systems, Inc. v. 
Chapman, 699 P.2d 766 (Utah 1985), which case is the only 
statement by the Utah Supreme Court regarding the right of an 
improperly licenced contractor to bring an action for compensation 
in the courts, under the present Utah licensing statute. The 
opinion in Wilderness clearly confirms that equitable exceptions 
to the statutory rule are still applicable. In Wilderness the 
Supreme Court held that, under the specific facts of that case, 
the equitable or "common law" exceptions traditionally afforded 
an improperly licenced contractor seeking compensation, did not 
apply. However, nowhere in the opinion does the Court state that 
those exceptions will not apply under any circumstances, or 
regardless of the inequity done to the Plaintiff. 
In Wilderness/ plaintiffs appealed from an adverse judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict which was entered on the grounds that 
neither plaintiff was a licensed contractor, so that their claims 
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were barred by operation of the Utah contractor licensing statute. 
The plaintiffs in Wilderness argued that three exceptions to the 
statutory bar to recovery were applicable to the facts in that 
case. First, that an unlicensed contractor may recover from one 
who is otherwise protected from the harm the licensing 
requirements were designed to prevent. The Court found that under 
the facts of the case, there was insufficient evidence to support 
the contention that the defendants were protected by their own 
knowledge and expertise. Thus the court, after considering the 
application of the exception to the statutory rule, held in favor 
of defendants. 
Second, plaintiffs argued that an unlicensed contractor may 
recover on a theory of unjust enrichment from one who knew or 
should have known at the time of contracting that the contractor 
was unlicensed, an argument which also failed under the particular 
facts of the Wilderness case. 
Finally, the plaintiffs urged that an unlicensed contractor 
may recover for work performed under the supervision of a licensed 
contractor. The Supreme Court rejected this argument because 
there was no evidence in the trial record to support the claim 
that plaintiff was supervised by a licenced contractor, where the 
claim was raised for the first time at oral argument on appeal. 
Id, at 769. Under the facts of Wilderness, the plaintiffs were 
not allowed to maintain their action for compensation. 
Contrary to Defendant's assertion in the case at bar, 
Wilderness indicates that the equitable exceptions to the 
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statutory bar are still in effect. The case at bar, is a proper 
factual case to enforce those exceptions. In Wilderness, 
plaintiffs cited many of the same cases on which Mackay now relies 
in support of its position. Nowhere in the Wilderness opinion 
does the court specifically overrule any of those cases, nor does 
it state that the principles of those cases are no longer 
enforceable. The fact that the Supreme Court reviewed the 
exceptions and their applicability to the facts of the case is 
strong evidence that the exceptions still exist and are applicable 
in a case such as the one at bar. 
In Fillmore Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving, Inc., 
561 P.2d 687 (Utah 1977), the Utah Supreme Court, quoting Corbin 
on Contracts, stated that: 
Where it is clear that the statute requires the license . . 
othe courts usually . . . hold that bargains made in breach 
of the law are not enforceable by the wrongdoer. This 
accords with sound policy except when it operates with 
disproportionate severity. . . . In general, the 
nonenforceability of (such) bargains will have a salutary 
effect in causing obedience to the licensing statute. 
Therefore, the general rule will no doubt continue to be 
maintained as the "general" rule, while still permitting the 
court to consider the merits of the particular case and to 
avoid unreasonable penalties and forfeitures. 
Although many courts yearn for a mechanically applicable 
rule, they have not made one in the present instance. 
Justice requires that the penalty should fit the crime; and 
justice and sound policy do not always require the 
enforcement of licensing statutes by large forfeitures going 
not to the state but repudiating defendants. Id. at 689 
(emphasis added). 
To bar Plaintiff's claim under the facts to the present case 
would be to work both an unreasonable penalty and a forfeiture, 
and would fly in the face of justice. This is especially true 
where Plaintiff seeks not to recover money due under the contract, 
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but merely the benefit of its bargain to resolve disputes in an 
alternate forum which is more advantageous and less expensive for 
both parties. In the present case, Plaintiff should be allowed to 
enforce the arbitration agreement notwithstanding the purported 
irregularities in its contractor's license where: (1) at all 
material times Plaintiff had been renewing a contractor's license 
but through inadvertence failed to change the name on the license 
from A, J, Mackay and Sons to A. J. Mackay Company, (2) the 
Defendant is not among the class whom the statute was intended to 
protect, an exception provided under the rule of Lingell v. Berg, 
593 P. 2d 800 (Utah), (3) the owner of the project was UDOT, 
another sophisticated contracting entity, is also not among the 
class intended to be protected, (4) Plaintiff acted as a 
subcontractor under the direct supervision of a licensed 
contractor with whom it has a well established history of 
contracting, and for whom Plaintiff's supervisor, at certain times 
worked on Defendant's payroll, the exception provided under the 
rule of Motivated Management v. Finney, 604 P.2d 467 (Utah 1979), 
and Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P. 2d 233 (Utah 1983), and (5) the 
equitable exceptions to the statutory rule, created by the cases 
previously cited by Plaintiff, including Loader v. Scott 
Construction Corp., 681 P.2d 1227 (Utah 1984) and Fillmore 
Products, Inc. v. Western States Paving, Inc., 561 P.2d 687 (Utah 
1977) are still controlling. Until the Supreme Court reverses its 
decision in these cases, the equitable exceptions to the statutory 
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bar here in question still apply under the proper circumstances, 
such as the present case. 
This application of the Utah cases was recently upheld in a 
ruling by Judge Frank G. Noel sitting on this Court. In the case 
of Scott v. Hotel Associates of Utah and Colorado, Ltd., Civil No. 
C85-7508, decided on September 16, 1988, the court was presented 
with the issue of an improperly licensed contractor's right to 
seek recovery in the courts. In that case the second-tier 
subcontractor's license had lapsed inadvertently where the 
subcontractor had failed to timely pay its renewal fee. After 
trial to the court, certain rulings were issued from the bench and 
certain other issues, the judge took under advisement. The court 
heard oral arguments on the issues taken under advisement on which 
it later rendered judgment in favor of the complaining 
subcontractor. The Court, in the proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which are still awaiting final approval, found 
that the subcontractor was not barred from recovery where (1) the 
lapse was inadvertent, (2) where the subcontractor's work was 
supervised and inspected by a duly licensed contractor, and (3) 
because the lapse of the license did not affect the degree of 
protection afforded the owner of the project, who is member of the 
class which the statute is designed to protect. 
Defendant Okland further argues that the Utah Statute should 
be strictly enforced based on California policy considerations and 
a holding by the California Court of Appeals in the case of 
General Insurance Co. v. Superior Court of San Bernardino Co., 102 
8 
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Cal. Rptr. 541 (Cal. App. 1972). While that case is, as Defendant 
suggests, an interesting comparison to the present case, it is 
without persuasive or precedential value where the Utah Supreme 
Court has already decided both the Utah law and Utah public policy 
issues relevant to the disposition of the present motion. The 
cases on which Plaintiff relies are replete with explanation of 
the legislative intent and purpose of the Utah State Legislature 
when it codified the common law rule into the present licensing 
statute. Regardless of what the California policy is, the policy 
in Utah is that although the statute acts as a general bar, it 
will not be enforced mechanically or strictly where the dangers 
against which the legislature sought to protect do not arise, and 
where strict enforcement of the statute would not be in the best 
interest of justice. 
Defendant argues, based on General Ins. that "If the 
legislature intended to create any exceptions, it could have 
easily added them to the statute. Such exceptions to the statute 
are matters for the legislature to determine and not for the 
courts." However, the Utah Supreme Court, in an effort to avoid 
unreasonable penalties and forfeitures not intended by the 
legislature, has carved out the exceptions pursuant to their 
equitable powers and in furtherance of the legislative purpose of 
protecting the general public from financially irresponsible 
contractors. These exceptions have survived for more than ten 
years during which time the legislature has had more than one 
opportunity to either narrow their application or remove them 
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altogether. It is more easily inferred from the legislative 
history on this issue, that the legislature supports application 
of the exceptions where the purpose of the statute is essentially 
met as it is in the present case, 
II. THIS PRESENT ACTION FILED BY PLAINTIFF IS NOT AN ACTION TO 
COLLECT COMPENSATION FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF ANY ACT COVERED 
BY THE UTAH CONTRACTOR LICENSING STATUTE. 
Defendant argues that because Plaintiff has failed to allege 
and prove that it was a properly licensed contractor during the 
times material to the subcontracts at issue in this action, 
Plaintiff is barred from instituting an action to collect 
compensation for acts performed under those contracts for which a 
license is required. In support of its argument, Defendant 
correctly quotes the licensing statute which states in pertinent 
part: 
No contractor may act as agent or commence or maintain any 
action in any court of the State for collection or 
compensation for the performance of any act for which a 
license is required by this chapter without alleging and 
proving that he was a properly licensed contractor when the 
contract sued upon was entered into and when the alleged 
cause of action arose. 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff denies that it was not properly 
licensed such that is entitled to maintain and action for damages 
or compensation due under the subcontracts or any other valid 
legal theory which is supported by the facts of this case. 
However, Plaintiff, did not initiate this present action for the 
purpose of litigating the merits of its claims for compensation 
for extra work performed on the project which was beyond the scope 
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of the subcontracts in this court. Plaintiff in this action seeks 
only specific performance of the arbitration provision of the 
subcontracts, a specific right granted by agreement of the 
parties, the enforcement of which is in the best interest of botl: 
Plaintiff and Defendant and in the interest of judicial economy 
and justice. This is not "any action" for collection 01 
compensation as contemplated by the statutory language. 
Therefore, Plaintiff is well within its rights to seek enforcement 
of its agreement to dispute its claims in a forum other than in a 
court of the State of Utah. The statute in this case under nc 
circumstances operates as a bar to the present action. 
III. WHETHER MACKAY HAS COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE SUBCONTRACT SO AS TO PRECLUDE RECOVERY ON ITS CLAIMS IS % 
MATTER OF FACT TO BE DECIDED BY THE ARBITRATION PANEL AND IS 
IRRELEVANT TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT 
UNDER THE SUBCONTRACTS. 
In its reply memo, Defendant argues that "It cannot be 
disputed that Mackay did not provide written notice of its claims 
as required by the agreements and no written amendment to the 
agreements exist with respect to the claims asserted by Mackay." 
This is a question of fact as to the merits of Plaintiff's claims. 
Plaintiff, in its motion for summary judgment, is not seeking 
adjudication of its claims on the merits by this Court, but rather 
the opportunity to present its case to the arbitrators as was 
agreed by the parties. Futhermore, whether the requisite notice 
was given is a disputed fact to be decided by adjudication. The 
parties agreed in the subcontracts that any such adjudication 
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would be by an arbitration panel and not by litigation in the 
courts. 
The parties to the subject subcontracts both contemplated 
arbitration as the method for resolving claims of the type now 
raised by Mackay. It is not Mackay who has now changed its mind 
in violation of the contracts, but rather it is Defendant which 
has gone to great length and expense to deny Plaintiff is rights 
under Defendant's own contract terms. The question of whether the 
claims of Mackay could withstand judicial scrutiny (while hotly 
contested) is irrelevant and immaterial and wholly inappropriate 
to the issue to be decided here, that is, whether the arbitration 
agreement is enforceable by Plaintiff. By making such an 
allegation, Defendant seeks to cloud the issues on which 
Plaintiff's motion rests and to avoid enforcement of the 
subcontracts by which Defendant is bound to arbitrate. 
IV. ARBITRATION IS NOT PRECLUDED WHERE PLAINTIFF AGREED TO ALLOW 
ITS SUPERVISOR TO WORK ON DEFENDANT'S PAYROLL IN AN EFFORT TO 
HELP DEFENDANT MEET ITS CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATIONS TO THE OWNER. 
Defendant, in asserting that the subcontracts containing the 
arbitration agreements do not apply because Plaintiff was an 
employee of Defendant and therefore is not entitled to the 
protection of its valid subcontracts, further attempts to confuse 
the issues. Plaintiff has asserted by affidavit that it did a 
portion of the project work with some of its personnel on the 
payroll of Defendant. It is an inappropriate misstatement of the 
case for Defendant to assert that Plaintiff is somehow precluded 
12 
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from enforcing its subcontracts because it also, as an 
accommodation to Defendant, placed some of its personnel on 
Defendant's payroll. The claims which Plaintiff now seeks to 
arbitrate arise under the terms of the subcontracts themselves 
which claims are subject to the arbitration agreements contained 
in said subcontracts• Defendant simply is seeking to avoid living 
up to the terms of the its very own subcontract form. 
V. THE ISSUE OF WHETHER PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS WILL ULTIMATELY PASS 
THROUGH TO UDOT IS NOT RELEVANT IN DETERMINING THE 
ENFORCEABILITY OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS BETWEEN 
PLAINTIFF AND DEFENDANT. 
Defendant argues incessantly that Plaintiff itself has raised 
material issues of fact as to whether its claims pass through to 
UDOT and whether UDOT is an indispensible party so as to preclude 
arbitration. The flaw in this argument is that the issue of 
whether Plaintiff's claims will ultimately pass through to UDOT is 
wholly immaterial to the issue to be decided here. Plaintiff is 
not in privity of contract with UDOT, and therefore has no ground 
on which to make claims for compensation for work performed beyond 
the scope of its subcontract directly to UDOT. Plaintiff's 
dispute is with Defendant alone. If Defendant expects to seek 
reimbursement from UDOT it can do so in its appropriate forum, a 
court of competent jurisdiction. 
The disposition of the issue of whether Plaintiff is entitled 
to arbitrate its disputed claims with Defendant is not dependent 
on UDOT in any way. The arbitration clause should be enforced as 
between Plaintiff and Defendant. In entering into the contract, 
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the parties intended to settle their disputes by arbitration* 
There is no provision in the subcontracts, express or implied, 
which would preclude arbitration because the interests of the 
owner might be involved. Plaintiff therefore relies on its 
arguments regarding the issue of "pass through" claims as 
presented in its Memorandum filed previously with this court. 
Defendant, in its Memorandum in Support of its Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, relied on several irrelevant and 
inappropriate cases in support its allegations, including one 
which purportedly supports the notion that UDOT is somehow an 
indispensible party to the arbitration proceedings. Defendant 
relies on the case of Matarasso v. Continental Casualty Co., 82 
A.D.2d 861, 440 N.Y.S.2d 40 (1981). In that case the New York 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division held that a nonparty to an 
arbitration agreement cannot be held to the arbitration agreement 
because he failed to seek a stay of arbitration within the 
statutory time limits. The main issue in that case was whether 
the claimant's uninsured motorist endorsement was applicable to 
his umbrella liability policy. The court found that it was not 
applicable such that the arbitration provision of the endorsement 
did not apply; therefore, the uninsured motorist insurer was 
allowed to stay the arbitration between the insured and the 
umbrella liability insurer. This case did not reach the issue of 
an indispensible party in either the arbitration or litigation 
contexts. It also did not decide the issue of whether arbitration 
is appropriate where it considers the interests of a non-party in 
14 
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the context of a construction contract. This case is not 
dispositive nor persuasive as to whether the valid arbitration 
provisions in the case at bar are enforceable as between the 
parties. 
VI. THERE IS NO ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT AS TO THE EXISTENCE OF THE 
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS. WHERE THE ONLY ISSUES OF FACT ARE 
WITH RESPECT TO THE MERITS OF THE CLAIMS TO BE ADJUDICATED, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT COMPELLING ARBITRATION SHOULD BE GRANTED IN 
FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF. 
At page of 11 of Defendant's Reply Memorandum, Defendant 
claims that Plaintiff has raised an issue of material fact as to 
whether the arbitration agreements which are the subject of this 
action exist so as to avoid summary judgment to compel 
arbitration. Defendant misconstrues the facts and asserts that 
there are no arbitration provisions to be enforced. As discussed 
previously herein, Plaintiff stated that its supervisor was on the 
payroll of Defendant, so as to help Defendant meet its contractual 
obligations with UDOT. Such arrangement did not abrogate the 
terms of the subcontracts. Payments made to the employee were 
chargeable against the subcontract amounts. This fact is, 
however, immaterial as to the determination of the issue of 
whether the arbitration provisions are enforceable, which is a 
matter of contract construction and a question of law. 
Defendant, in making its argument has also misapplied the 
wholly irrelevant case of Jackson v. Dabney, 648 P.2d. 613 (Utah 
1982), In Dabney the Utah Supreme Court held that summary 
judgment was precluded where genuine issues of fact exist such 
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that reasonable minds could differ on whether defendant's conduct 
was in breach of the standard of care required of an attorney in 
dealing with his client* Not only was the Court in Dabney not 
called upon to decide the issue of whether an arbitration 
agreement was enforceable, it did not even have to decide the 
issue of summary judgment based on a contract claim. The issues 
of fact which are sufficient to preclude summary judgment as to 
arbitration agreements are those which shed doubt as to whether 
the right exists in the moving party. Here the only questions of 
fact raised by Defendant relate to the merits of Plaintiff's 
claims and not its right to arbitrate. There are no facts raised 
by either party about which reasonable minds could differ, 
regarding the enforceability of the arbitration provisions. 
Defendant, without saying so directly, seems to argue that if some 
of Plaintiff's employees were on Defendant's payroll, then the 
subcontracts do not exist. Such an argument would be 
preposterous. 
The arbitration agreements, as pointed out by Plaintiff here 
and in its earlier memorandum, should be enforced as a matter of 
law by way of summary judgment. Plaintiff, under the facts on 
record with this court is entitled to summary judgment compelling 
arbitration as a matter of law, and also as a matter of well 
established public policy. 
16 
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VII. THE POLICY FAVORING JUDICIAL ECONOMY IS NOT OFFENDED BY THE 
ENFORCEMENT OF THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT IN THIS CASE. 
Defendant argues that arbitration in this case will not be 
more expeditious and inexpensive in the interest of judicial 
economy and justice, because enforcing the arbitration agreements 
will potentially involve multiple proceedings and possible 
inconsistent determinations of the same issues regarding claims 
which Okland hopes to pass through to UDOT. Defendant also argues 
that arbitration in this case would only frustrate the policies 
which Plaintiff contends it is intended to further. In making 
this contention, however, Defendant has cited authority which is 
not only unpersuasive, but that is not applicable to the issue 
being decided in the present motion. For example, Defendant 
relies heavily on the case of Exber, Inc. v. Sletten Construction 
Co., 558 P.2d 517 (Nev. 1976). In that case, both the prime 
contract and the subcontract contained arbitration agreements. 
The court, in deciding whether to stay the proceedings between the 
owner and the contractor pending arbitration ordered the 
consolidation of the arbitration cases in one arbitration 
proceeding. The fact that both contracts contained arbitration 
provisions distinguishes this case completely from the one at bar. 
Furthermore, in Exber the court ordered arbitration. Exber does 
not stand for the proposition that where the owner is not subject 
to the arbitration provision of the subcontract, the arbitration 
should be disallowed in favor of litigation between all three 
parties. Furthermore, UDOT is not a party to either the present 
litigation or the future arbitration. It is, at this point, a 
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wholly disinterested party who's rights cannot be effected by the 
ruling of the arbitration panel* This action is on the 
subcontracts alone. 
Exber, however, does speak to the severability of non-
arbitrable issues, which Defendant claims exist in the present 
case in the form of pass through claims. Notably, even the Exber 
court held that "All doubts concerning arbitrability of subject 
matter of the dispute are to be resolved in favor of arbitration; 
once it is determined that an arbitrable issue exists, the parties 
are not to be deprived by the courts of the benefits of 
arbitration for which it bargained." Id. at 523. Defendant 
contends that because certain claims may ultimately pass through 
to UDOT, they are not the proper subject of arbitration. The 
issue of potential pass through claims is itself a factual matter 
to be resolved by the panel of arbitrators. Furthermore, if 
Defendant did not want to have to arbitrate Plaintiff's claims 
arising from the subcontracts, it should not have included the 
arbitration agreements in its subcontracts. 
Defendant also relies on the case of Belke v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 693 F.2d 1023 (1982), to preclude 
enforcement of the arbitration agreements. In Belke Plaintiff 
sought recovery for violations of the federal securities laws and 
state common-law. Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and 
application for stay pending arbitration were denied by the 
district court. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit held in favor of the Plaintiff and ordered 
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arbitration of its arbitrable claims. The court found that 
"because federal law favors arbitration, any party arguing waiver 
of arbitration bears a heavy burden of proof." It also held that 
federal securities claims are not arbitrable. Ultimately, the 
court stated that when arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims are 
inextricably intertwined, the district court should deny 
arbitration as to the arbitrable claims in order to protect the 
jurisdiction of the federal court and avoid any possible 
preclusive effect." 
In the case at bar, there are no clearly non-arbitrable 
claims, as Defendant would suggest. Futhermore, there can be no 
danger to the jurisdiction of the court where the State court is a 
court of general jurisdiction and there is no federal question 
raised by either party. The arbitration award, if any, would be 
subject to approval by the court and would not have any preclusive 
effect not intended by the parties at the time of contracting • 
Belke is therefore easily distinguishable from the case at bar and 
has very little persuasive value. 
Enforcement of the arbitration agreement in this case will 
further the policies of judicial economy and justice and at the 
same time give meaning to the intent of the parties expressed in 
the subcontracts. Arbitration will result in lower dispute 
resolution costs to both parties, enforcement of the contract and 
a narrowing of the issues, if any to be resolved as between 
Defendant and UDOT. Arbitration is proper in this case and should 
be compelled. 
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Defendant also relies heavily on the case of Rosenthal v. 
Berman, 82 A.2d 455 (New Jersey 1951) in support of its contention 
that Defendant will be prejudiced if it is forced to arbitrate 
Plaintiff's claims and then seek reimbursement in a subsequent 
proceeding. But Rosenthal does not save Defendant under the 
present circumstances. In Rosenthal the court was faced with the 
dilemma of five parties to the litigation, only two of which had a 
contractual duty to arbitrate. Here there are no parties to the 
litigation which are not bound by the arbitration agreement. 
Defendant claims that severing this litigation into the 
arbitration and subsequent litigation of potential pass through 
claims will increase the cost of justice, or cause undue hardship 
to the parties. UDOT is not a party either to the litigation or 
the future arbitration. Neither has it been established by the 
appropriate finder of fact that pass through claims even exist 
which Defendant will be forced to litigate with UDOT. There is, 
under the rule of Rosenthal or otherwise, no rational basis for 
not compelling the arbitration of Plaintiff's claims. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant has struggled to avoid arbitration in this case to 
the point where it has made claims which are not supported by 
either the facts of the case or by the relevant law. Defendant 
should honor its own subcontract obligations and not misconstruing 
the facts and stretch legal authority in support of its misguided 
allegations. Plaintiff does not seek disposition of its claims in 
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this action, but only the enforcement of its contractual right to 
arbitrate its claims with Defendant. Defendant has failed to 
raise any question of material fact as to the enforceability of 
the arbitration provisions of the subcontracts such that Plaintiff 
is now entitled to judgment as a matter of law, 
DATED this day of February, 1989. 
WALSTAD & BABCOCK, P.C. 
By. tLJcf&JLl 
Robert F. Babcock 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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